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Foreword 
This EUI Working Paper is based on research conducted in 2012-2015 in the FP7 project 
SURVEILLE. The research has earlier been reported to the European Commission in the form of what 
in that context is called project deliverables. Most of the deliverables have also been published on the 
website of the project. In order better to reach academic audiences in Europe and beyond, the EUI 
Law Department decided to publish selected SURVEILLE research reports also in the form of 
Working Papers. The current paper is one in that series. 
SURVEILLE (Surveillance: Ethical Issues, Legal Limitations, and Efficiency) was a multidisciplinary 
project that developed a new methodology for the assessment of surveillance technologies. This 
methodology seeks to enable a more rational and structured process of decision-making concerning 
the use of surveillance technologies, as compared to abstract references to the need to find a “balance”, 
for instance between privacy and security. The methodology developed in SURVEILLE is based on 
three parallel expert assessments of the use of any specific surveillance technology in a given context. 
The technology assessment incorporates issues of actual delivery towards a legitimate aim such as 
improved security, and issues of various types of financial cost. It results in a so-called usability score, 
based on ten different criteria. This score can be compared against a fundamental rights intrusion score 
that is based on expert assessments of the importance of a fundamental right (often the right to privacy 
or the right to the protection of personal data) in the situation at hand, and of the depth of the intrusion 
into that right as results from the surveillance. An independent ethics assessment will inform the 
holistic overall assessment and the comparison between the two scores, by indicating three different 
levels of moral hazard in the use of surveillance. The SURVEILLE methodology can assist legislators, 
policymakers, technology developers and end-users of surveillance technologies (such as the police or 
local authorities) in a process of rational, transparent and controlled decision-making over 
surveillance. The traditional legal requirements of legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality are all 
incorporated into the SURVEILLE methodology but in a manner that allows their operationalisation 
through the multidisciplinary approach of the three parallel assessments and an informed comparison 
of their outcomes. 
In addition to developing the assessment methodology as just described, SURVEILLE generated 
multiple lines of academic research on technological, sociological, ethical and legal issues concerning 
surveillance. The current Working Paper emanates from that research. 
In Florence, 30 September 2015  
 
Martin Scheinin, Professor of International Law and Human Rights, EUI 
SURVEILLE Consortium Leader 
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General Introduction 
This Working Paper is based on two research reports that were the outcome of the research carried out 
by the team of the Université Libre de Bruxelles within the FP7 project SURVEILLE.
1
 Such research 
focused on the use of surveillance technologies for the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of 
serious crime. Taken together, the two reports developed a comparative analysis of a number of 
surveillance technologies and techniques used at different stages of the criminal procedure within 
selected national jurisdictions. The first project deliverable, finalised in October 2012 and entitled 
“The use of surveillance technologies for the prevention and investigation of serious crime” (D4.1)2, 
addressed the use of the interception of telecommunications and video-surveillance in three countries, 
namely France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The second deliverable, finalised in April 2013 and 
entitled “Comparative law paper on data retention regulation on a sample of EU Member States” 
(D4.3), examined the rules governing the retention of data by telecommunications companies and 
internet service providers for criminal justice purposes in nine countries (i.e. Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom). The two reports 
test the existence of what the authors call a double shift: the means at the disposal of competent 
national authorities (intelligence services and law enforcement agencies) in the fight against serious 
crime are evolving in such a way that the share of tasks and competences is now increasingly blurred. 
The fundamental rights dimension was the normative background of the legal dimensions of the 
SURVEILLE project as a whole, and thus also of the present work. The impact of evolving trends in 
the use of surveillance upon the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data are at 
the core of this research undertaking. 
The authors wish to highlight that legislation is changing very quickly in this domain both at the 
national level and at the EU level. In particular, the January 2015 attacks in Paris against Charlie 
Hebdo, the February 2015 attacks in Copenhagen and the increasing threat resulting from the foreign 
fighters phenomenon are significantly challenging the effectiveness of means used by States to 
prevent, investigate, detect and prosecute terrorist offences. Recent legislative developments deepen 
the blur between the tasks and functions of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies as well 
as the blur between administrative and criminal law measures. Furthermore, with the ruling by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union on 8 April 2014 in the Digital Rights Ireland case
3
 - partially 
reaffirmed in Schrems
4
, EU Member States together with EU institutions have to rethink the legal 
framework concerning the use of surveillance technologies and techniques in order to ensure a 
coherent relationship between on the one hand safeguarding the right to privacy and the protection of 
personal data, and on the other hand developing effective means to prevent, investigate, detect and 
prosecute serious crime.
5
  
                                                     
 
1 See all deliverables and events organised during the project on SURVEILLE’s website : www.surveille.eui.eu.  
2 The research conducted for this paper has also resulted in an article: Céline Cocq and Francesca Galli, “The catalysing 
effect of serious crime on the use of surveillance technologies for prevention and investigation purposes”, N.J.E.C.L., 
vol.4, 2013/3. 
3 CJEU, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others case, C-293/12 and C-594/12, 8 April 2014.  
 
4 CJEU, Schrems v DPC, C-362/14, 6 October 2015; ‘Safe Harbour ruling’. 
5 See e.g. Céline Cocq and Francesca Galli, “Data retention regime within the EU: Reinventing a common framework after 
the CJEU ruling?” European Journal of Policing Studies (forthcoming in 2015).  
 
  
 
Despite the fact that the two papers were written at least two years ago, the information remains 
largely up to date. These papers analyse a trend that has been occurring for some years and that is not 
over yet: a massive use of surveillance technologies and techniques by an increasing number of 
competent authorities leading to an exponential gathering of information by EU Member States aiming 
to fight more effectively against serious crime - often at the expense of fundamental rights.  
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Part 1. The use of surveillance technologies for the prevention and investigation of serious crime 
Introduction 
The years following 11 September 2001 with the 2004 bombings in Madrid, the 2005 attacks in 
London, the 2011 attacks in Norway and the 2012 attacks in Toulouse show profound changes in the 
terrorism threat and the emergence of the parallel phenomena of home-grown terrorism and lone-
wolves terrorist actors.
6
 
Such changes have had a tremendous impact on the criminal justice system as a whole leading to a 
progressive shift towards prevention in the fight against terrorism at the national as well as at the EU 
level.
7
 The evolving terrorist threat has had most importantly a catalysing effect on: the enactment of 
new inchoate offences and the criminalisation of preparatory activities
8
; and, the development of 
anticipative/proactive criminal investigation.
9
  
The deliverable focuses on one fundamental change within this second dimension, namely the 
increasing use of surveillance technologies in the fight against serious crime,
10
 and especially against 
terrorism.
11
 In fact, by contrast with the DETECTER Project
12
, for which the scope of the research was 
limited to terrorism, the FP7 SURVEILLE project covers “serious crimes”13, which includes 
terrorism.
14
   
Thus, this paper is to be seen in the context of the SURVEILLE project, which offers a legal and 
ethical analysis of issues surrounding the use of surveillance technologies in three phases of 
countering serious crimes (prevention, investigation and prosecution) at the national as well as at the 
                                                     
 
6 See EUROPOL, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) (2012); K.L. Thachuk and al., Homegrown Terrorism. 
The Threat Within, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University (2008); T. Precht, 
Home grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalisation in Europe, Danish Ministry of Justice (2007).  
7 See e.g. G. de Kerchove, “L’Union européenne et le monde dans la lutte contre le terrorisme” in M. Dony (ed.), La 
dimension externe de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice au lendemain de Lisbonne et de Stockholm: un bilan à 
mi-parcours, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles (Bruxelles, 2012); M. Donini, « Sicurezza e diritto penale », (2008) 10 
Cass pen 3558.  
8 See e.g. K. Sugman Stubbs and F. Galli, “Inchoate offences. The sanctioning of an act prior to and irrespective of the 
commission of any harm” in F. Galli and A. Weyembergh (eds.), EU counter-terrorism offences: what impact on 
national legislation and case law, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles (Bruxelles,  2012).  
9 See e.g. M.F.H. Hirsch Ballin, Anticipative criminal investigations. Theory and counter-terrorism practice in the 
Netherlands and the United States, TMC Asser Press, (The Hague, 2012).  
10 Yet serious crime is not defined as such in EU law (art. 83(1) TFUE). For the purpose of the analysis examples are hence 
taken from national legislation, mostly with reference to organised crime and terrorism. Both categories are particularly 
relevant because they have lead to the introduction of specific legal regimes for the use of surveillance technologies 
within the three countries. 
11 See e.g. H. Fenwick (ed.), Development in counter-terrorist measures and uses of technology, Routledge (Abingdon, 
2012).  
12 DETECTER Project (Detection Technologies, Counter-Terrorism Ethics, and Human Rights), FP7 Security Programme, 
www.detecter.bham.ac.uk (accessed on 27 October 2012) 
13 SURVEILLE Project FP7, SEC 2011.6.1-5, Surveillance and challenges for the security of the citizen, Annex 1 – 
“Description of Work”, p. 12 
14 SURVEILLE Project, Annex 1 – “Description of Work”, p. 4-15 
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EU level. It is based on the definitions provided within this project
15
 and should be read in conjunction 
with the other deliverables submitted or soon to be submitted.
16
   
The comparative study tests the existence of a double shift mainly resulting from the catalysing effect 
of serious crime.  
Firstly, surveillance technologies introduced in relation to serious crimes (e.g. interception of 
telecommunications) are increasingly used for the purpose of preventing and investigating “minor” 
offences; at the same time, surveillance technologies originally used for public order purposes in 
relation to minor offences (e.g. CCTV cameras) are now increasingly affected to the prevention and 
investigation of serious crime.  
On the one side, serious crime including terrorism has had a catalysing effect on the criminal justice 
system, prompting an increased use of surveillance techniques and technologies. The subsequent 
introduction of derogatory provisions has been first regarded as exceptional and limited in scope first 
to terrorism and then to organised crime. Through a normalisation process at the initiative of the 
legislator, specific measures have become institutionalised over time as part of the ordinary criminal 
justice system and they have a tendency to be applied beyond their original scope.
17
  
On the other side, a parallel shift has occurred in the opposite direction. Video-surveillance 
technologies, which are one of the most obvious and widespread signs of the development of 
surveillance, were originally conceived by the private sector for security purpose. They have been 
subsequently employed for public order purposes and finally in the prevention of minor offences 
and/or petty crimes (such as street crimes or small drug dealers). In such context, they were rather a 
tool to deter would-be criminals rather than an investigative means.
18
 At the same time, the terrorist 
threat has become an argument for an even more extensive use of video surveillance.  
The question therefore arises as to: whether there is still a difference to be made between means that 
can be used only in the fight against serious crime and others applicable only to counter minor 
offences; or whether a mutual contamination has occurred so that means originally introduced in one 
or the other domain are now applicable to both the prevention and investigation of serious crime and 
minor offences.  
Secondly, means at the disposal of each actor (intelligence
19
 and law enforcement agencies) for the 
prevention and investigation of serious crime are evolving so that the share of tasks and competences 
has become blurred.  
When coping in particular with the terrorism threat, democratic States have had to redraw the 
boundaries between the different tasks involving surveillance, namely protecting national security, 
                                                     
 
15 See infra. 
16 SURVEILLE, Surveillance : Ethical Issues, Legal limitations and Efficiency, FP7-SEC-2011-284725, “Report describing 
the design of the research apparatus for the European-level study of perceptions”, D3.1, October 2012; “Survey of 
surveillance technologies, including their specific identification for further work”, D2.1 August 2012. 
17 O. Gross, ‘Chaos and rules’ (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1011, 1090; D. Dyzenhaus, “The permanence of the temporary” 
in R.J. Daniels and others (eds.), The security of freedom, University of Toronto Press (Toronto, 2001). 
18 e.g. A. Bauer and F. Freynet, Vidéosurveillance and vidéoprotection, PUF (Paris, 2008); EFUS, Citizens, Cities and video 
surveillance, Towards a democratic and responsible use of CCTV, ed. EFUS (Paris, 2010) pp. 183-84; Vidéo-
surveillance Infos, "Dispositif de sécurité au stade de France: ergonomie et évolutivité" (14 October 2011).   
19 Intelligence information refers to “secret material collected by intelligence agencies and increasingly by the police to 
provide background information and advance warning about people who are thought to be a risk to commit acts of 
terrorism or other threats to national security”.19 K. Roach, “Secret evidence and its alternatives” in A. Masferrer (ed.), 
Post 9/11 and the state of permanent legal emergency. Security and human rights in countering terrorism, Ius Gentium: 
Comparative Perspectives on law and justice, Springer (2012) p. 180. 
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maintaining public order, preventing and investigating crimes. This has taken several forms: the 
extension of surveillance powers in all these tasks; the emergence of new challenges resulting from the 
use of intelligence information gathered for national security purposes in criminal prosecutions; the 
sharing of information and the creation of “fusion centres” where data are merged while maintaining 
more or less a division of tasks between intelligence agencies and law enforcement authorities.  
Such a development has led to an unclear situation as a broad range of investigation techniques and 
technologies may be used in relation to different offences as well as at different phases of the 
procedure, e.g. prevention or investigation.  
The question to be assessed in relation to the second dimension of the shift is thus whether the current 
trend has provided an opportunity to clarify the share of tasks and competences between intelligence 
services and law enforcement authorities (including police administrative and police judiciaire) or 
rather whether it lead to a more blurred division.  
A blurred division would lead to both a situation of legal uncertainty and a competition between the 
different actors involved. 
Surveillance may be defined as “the keeping of watch over someone or something. Technological 
surveillance is the use of technological techniques or devices to detect attributes, activities, people, 
trends, or events.”20 
For the purpose of this research, two surveillance technologies – used by both law enforcement 
authorities and intelligences agencies – have been chosen as the examples of the first dimension of the 
double shift hypothesis: the interception of telecommunications and video surveillance (most 
importantly CCTV cameras). 
It is noteworthy that interception of telecommunications is a broader category than “phone 
interception” as it encompasses also the interception of emails or other messages sent via the 
Internet.
21
 This kind of interceptions operate in real time and may deal with the content of the 
telecommunications and is thus more intrusive into privacy than other measures such as identification 
or tracking, which do not address the content. The scope of this study does not include provisions on 
the retention on data by private companies for either commercial of law enforcement purposes which 
will constitute the focus of subsequent research.
22
 
In relation to video-surveillance technologies, this article only focuses on the use devices installed 
either by public authorities (e.g. in the streets, train stations, airport, stadium) or by private companies 
(e.g. shopping malls, outside banks) for prevention purpose. Thus, neither the video-surveillance 
taking place in the framework of a criminal investigation, authorised and then executed by judicial 
competent authorities with reference to a targeted individual nor the video-surveillance under the 
supervision of public authorities in private premises are part of this deliverable.   
                                                     
 
20 J.K. Petersen, Handbook of surveillance technologies, 3d ed., CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group (2012) p. 10. Within the 
SURVEILLE Project, surveillance is defined as “targeted or systematic monitoring of persons, places, items, means of 
transport or flows of information in order to detect specific, usually criminal, forms or conduct, or other hazards, and 
enable, typically, a preventive, protective or reactive response or the collection of data for preparing such a response in 
the future”. Surveillance technologies are hence “the use of any human-made devices in surveillance” or methods “used 
to detect something in a security or safety context, with the focus on a law enforcement, customs or security authority”. 
SURVEILLE Project, Annex 1 “Description of Work”, p. 5. 
21 In the United Kingdom, s. 2 RIPA 2000 defines a telecommunication system as « any system which exists for the purpose 
of facilitating the transmission of communications by any means involving the use of electrical or electro-magnetic 
energy ». Remarkably, in some countries the same rules apply to the interception of communications via the Internet, 
whereas in others there is a gap in the existing regulation and this constitutes part of the problem. 
22 See “Comparative paper on data retention regulation in a sample of EU Member States”, SURVEILLE Project, D4.3 
(submitted on 30 April 2013). 
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This study focuses on three EU Member States, namely France, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Various reasons justify this choice: these states have experienced terrorism before 9/11 and the fight 
against serious crime has long been a priority; they also are working together in the EU G6;
23
 their 
national legislation has been a point of reference for the development of EU policies and instruments 
such as the two Framework Decisions on combating terrorism of 2002 and 2008.
24
 Moreover the 
chosen case studies must be representative of: both common law and civil law systems; different 
criminal procedure systems (accusatorial/inquisitorial/mixed); different systems of share of 
competences and of articulation between intelligence and law enforcement bodies (including police 
administrative and police judiciaire).
25
  
The use of surveillance technologies and additionally the information gathered is particularly sensitive 
with regard to the right to privacy they may affect and the principle of proportionality with reference 
to the conditions allowing for their use.
26
  The human rights dimension will be the backdrop of this 
research.  
The deliverable will provide a brief overview of criminal procedure developments in the selected 
Member States resulting from the catalysing effect of organised crime and terrorism (2). Then it will 
analyse the different elements of the double shift with reference to the two surveillance technologies 
chosen as case studies: the interception of telecommunications (3) and video-surveillance (4). 
Eventually, it will ascertain the existence of a blur in the share of tasks (5).  
The expansion of derogatory regimes to cope with serious crime  
In the three Member States, specific (and often derogatory) provisions, both of substantive criminal 
law and criminal procedure, have been adopted over time in order to fight against serious crime, 
especially against terrorism and/or organised crime.
27
  
Remarkably, both in France and in Italy there has been a reciprocal influence of anti-terrorism and 
anti-organised crime legislation during the last thirty years and the subsequent re-enactment of 
repealed provisions following a new outburst of terrorism or organised crime at different stages. 
In Italy, since 1975 (Law 152/1975) special measures adopted to deal with the domestic terrorist threat 
have been progressively introduced as derogations to the ordinary principles of criminal law.
28
 The 
                                                     
 
23 The EU G6 is an internal security vanguard made up of the interior ministries of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland 
and Spain. According to H. Brady, “with the possible exception of Poland, these countries all feel threatened by terrorism 
and have elaborate national counter-terror systems”, H. Brady, “Intelligence, emergencies and foreign policy – The EU’s 
role in counter-terrorism”, Centre for European Reform (2009) p. 7.  
24 Framework Decision 2002/474/JHA on combating terrorism [2002] OJ L 164/3 and Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA 
[2008] OJ L 330/21. For a detailed comment on the interplay between the two instruments see Galli and Weyembergh 
(eds.), EU counter-terrorism offences, pp. 11-32, pp. 49-64; pp. 83-98; pp. 117-132.  
25 The organisation for each State differs according to his traditional system: the common law division (police intelligence, 
police investigation and prosecution by judicial authorities) and the civil law twofold division (administrative police and 
judicial police). 
26 S. Van Drooghenbroeck, La proportionnalité dans le droit de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Prendre 
l’idée au sérieux, Bruylant, (Bruxelles, 2001); C. Warbrick, ‘The ECHR and the Prevention of Terrorism’ (1983) 32 
ICLQ 82 ; Institute for prospective technological studies, Security and privacy for the citizen in the Post-September 11 
digital age: A prospective overview, Report to the European Parliament Committee  on citizens’ freedoms and rights, 
justice and home affairs (LIBE), EUR 20823 (July 2003); M. Levi and D.S. Wall, "Technologies, Security, and Privacy 
in the Post-9/11 European Information Society" (2004) 31(2) Journal of Law and Society 194. 
27 F. Galli, British, French and Italian measures to deal with terrorism: a comparative study, Doctoral thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 2009 (yet unpublished).  
28 G. Illuminati, “Reati “speciali” e procedure “speciali” nella legislazione d’emergenza” (1981) Giustizia Penale 106.  
Francesca Galli and Céline C. Cocq 
5 
enactment of the new Codice di Procedura Penale in 1988 was meant to redress the numerous 
derogations brought about by the emergency legislation in the previous decade. However, from when 
the level of the threat from organised crime increased once again at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
existing tools seem inadequate and major changes in the law came along in the form of subsequent 
layers of new principles, rules and exceptions and not as a coherent legislative design (see e.g. Law 
203/1991).
 29
 With the enactment of Law 438/2001 and Law 155/2005 the scope of many of these 
provisions has been extended to cope with the newly emergent international terrorist threat.  
On 9 March 2004, the French Parliament enacted the so-called Loi Perben II (Law 204/2004), which 
contains the most far-reaching amendments of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure of the 
last decades.
30
 In this context special anti-terrorist procedures (e.g. with regard to house searches, 
identification of individuals, garde à vue, surveillance, or interception of communications) have been 
applied to a long catalogue of offences classified as “organised crime”. As in the case of the definition 
of terrorism as a criminal offence, the legislator has not attempted to define “organised crime” and has 
merely introduced in the Code de Procédure Pénale a list of more than thirty offences to which special 
procedures become applicable. This list also includes a number of less serious offences (such as 
extortion, procuring or assistance in the illegal entry of immigrants) which do not obviously justify the 
use of extraordinary powers. The legislator can expand this catalogue at any time.   
In the United Kingdom, the counter-terrorism “arsenal” is only the tip of the iceberg of a broader 
phenomenon, most importantly in relation to the use of administrative measures which are no longer 
exceptional and temporary, nor are they necessarily linked with a genuine emergency (see e.g. Sexual 
Offences Prevention Orders (SOPO) and Risk of Sexual Harm Orders, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders 
(ASBOs), Serious Crime Prevention Orders and Violent Offender Orders. Not all preventive orders 
require a criminal offence to have been committed).
31
  
In relation to the definition of terrorism the three countries have taken similar approaches.
32
 In the 
first place, the aim of the attempts was to prompt the use of special procedural measures. Secondly, the 
definitions adopted at different stages share a common core of mens rea derived from international 
sources: the intention to make indiscriminate use of violent activities to spread intimidation or terror 
within a community and thus influence an institutional figure for political or subversive purposes. 
French law attaches to such mens rea a list of existing criminal offences. The British definition, by 
contrast, encompasses only a list of behaviours exemplifying which type of activities would be 
proceeded against under the Terrorism Act 2000. And in Italy the definition is left open: any act 
committed with the identified mens rea would be considered an offence with a terrorist intent.
33
 
 
                                                     
 
29 P.L. Vigna, "Il processo accusatorio nell’impatto con le esigenze di lotta alla criminalità organizzata” (1991) Giustizia 
Penale 462.  
30 J. Pradel, "Vers un ‘‘aggiornamento’’ des réponses de la procédure pénale à la criminalité" (2004) 19 Semaine Juridique 
132 and (20) Semaine Juridique 134.  
31 Some require the subject to have been convicted or an offence, and others require the civil court imposing the order to be 
satisfied that he has committed one. 
32 art. 421(1) French Code Penal, art. 270 sexies Italian Codice Penale, s. 1 UK Terrorism Act 2000 
33 F. Galli, British, French and Italian measures to deal with terrorism: a comparative study, pp. 60-72 (yet unpublished). 
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Definition of organised crime 
 
 France Italy United Kingdom 
Definition Association de 
malfaiteurs
34
 (no need 
of a number of 
associates) 
Association de 
malfaiteurs 
(identification of a 
number of associates) 
“individuals, normally 
working with others, 
with the capability to 
commit serious crime 
on a continuing basis, 
which includes 
elements of planning, 
control and 
coordination, and 
benefits those involved. 
A significant 
proportion of organised 
criminals are 
motivated, principally, 
by the desire to make 
money.” 35 
Reference Art. 450(1) Penal Code Art. 416 and 416 bis 
PC 
HM Government, 
Local to global: 
reducing the risk from 
organised crime, 
within the organised 
crime strategy of 28 
July 2011 
 
In France and in Italy, the law aimed at criminalising only those associations which were actively 
organised in gangs, the members acting with a common purpose framed by the existence of chiefs and 
conventions for the distribution of profits. By contrast with the parallel Italian provisions, the French 
Penal Code did not identify a minimum number of associates.
36
  
The United Kingdom definition is less precise than the French or Italian ones. The structure and 
organisation of such groups may vary: they may consist of a durable group of key individuals 
surrounded by a cluster of subordinates or loose networks of individuals coming together for the 
duration of a criminal activity, acting in different roles depending on their skills and expertise.
 37
 
                                                     
 
34 More narrowly drawn than the crime of conspiracy in English Law, in particular because the association must be 
demonstrated by acts putting it into execution. 
35 HM Government, Local to global : reducing the risk from organised crime, Policy paper, Organised crime strategy, 28 
July 2011, p. 5 and 8. 
36 For a detailed account of the origins and purpose of this offence in Italy see G. Fiandaca, « I reati associativi nella recente 
evoluzione legislativa » in A. Spataro and others, Il Coordinamento delle Indagini di Criminalità Organizzata e 
Terrorismo, CEDAM (Padova 2004) pp. 1-34; and, in France, see M.C. Adolphe and M.F. Hélie, Théorie du Code Pénal. 
Vol III, Marchal et Billard (Paris 1887).  
37 Serious Organised Crime Agency at http://www.soca.gov.uk/threats/organised-crime-groups (accessed 1 March 2013); D. 
Blunkett, Home Secretary, White paper One Step Ahead – A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime, March 
2004 used this definition adopted by the NCIS (National Criminal Intelligence Service); see also, M. Maguire,  R. 
Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford handbook of criminology, 5th ed., (Oxford, 2012) p. 601.  
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Towards a generalised use of surveillance technologies? The interception of telecommunications 
Provisions concerning the interception of telecommunications in terrorist and organised crime cases 
often derogate from the ordinary regime.  
In France and in Italy, two types of interceptions of telecommunications exist according to the phases 
of the procedure.  
In France, a distinction must be drawn between interception of telecommunications during a judicial 
investigation for the detection and the investigation of a crime (judicial interceptions), and 
interceptions authorised by the executive for security reasons (administrative interceptions) called 
interceptions de sécurité.
38
  
Law 646/1991 provides the legal framework for both judicial (art. 100 ff CPP) and administrative 
interceptions (nowadays encompassed in the Code de la Sécurité Intérieure), as amended in 2002, 
2004, 2006 and 2012.
39
 Article 1 of Law 646/1991 reaffirms the principle of the secrecy of 
communications, from which only the public authority can derogate under the circumstances of public 
interest recognised and restricted by the law.
40
  
As detailed below, over the years the legal regime of judicial interceptions has been considered by 
some to be too strict and inadequate and thus extraordinary provisions have been introduced for the 
purpose of an effective fight against organised crime.  
The Italian regime reproduces the distinction between ante-delictum and post-delictum interceptions.
41
 
In ordinary cases, judicial interceptions of telecommunications are regulated by art. 266 and ff. CPP. 
Preventive interceptions are currently regulated under art. 226 disp. att. CPP, identifying the 
authorities entitled to apply for and issue interception warrants, the purpose of such application, and its 
specific content.
42
 It is noteworthy that ante-delictum interceptions are not exclusively an 
administrative prerogative in Italian law.  
The communications intercepted cannot be used as evidence when a professional privilege or a State 
or public secret is involved.
43
 Additionally, interceptions made without complying with the relevant 
conditions are invalid and cannot be used at trial. This is one of the oldest ‘exclusionary rules’ in the 
Italian system.
44
  
                                                     
 
38 F.-B. Huyghe, Les écoutes téléphoniques, Que sais-je ? PUF, n°3874 (Paris 2010) ; C. Guerrier, Les écoutes téléphoniques, 
CNRS (Paris, 2000) ; R. Errera, Les origines de la loi française du 10 juillet 1991 sur les écoutes téléphoniques, Revue 
trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 55 (July 2003) pp. 851-870 ; J. Pradel, ‘Un exemple de restauration de la légalité 
criminelle’ (1992) Dalloz 49. 
39 The law applies not only to phone tapping but to all means of telecommunications (telephone, fax, telex, communication 
by radio, broadcasting of images, electronic communication, etc.).  
40 Freedom of expression is considered of constitutional value. DC n°84-181 (1984). Also art. L241-1 CSI. 
41 G. Spangher, “La disciplina italiana delle intercettazioni di conversazioni o comunicazioni” 1 Archivio Penale 3, 1994; P. 
Balducci, Le garanzie nelle intercettazioni tra Costituzione e legge ordinaria, Milano, Giuffrè 2003; C. Parodi, Le 
intercettazioni. Profili operativi e giurisprudenziali, Giappichelli (2002); A. Balsamo, “Intercettazioni: gli standards 
europei, la realtà italiana, le prospettive di riforma”(2009) 10 Cass pen 4023. 
42 See in relation to terrorist offences G. Garuti, “Le intercettazioni preventive nella lotta al terrorismo internazionale” (2005) 
Diritto Penale e Processo 1457  
43 G. Illuminati (ed.), Nuovi profili del segreto di stato e dell’attività di intelligence, Giappichelli, (Torino 2011).  
44 art. 271 CPP. 
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Exceptional provisions for the interception of communication under less stringent requirements were 
first enacted by art. 13 Law 203/1991 for the investigation of organised crime offences.
45
 The 
complete re-organisation of the provisions on interceptions is one of the most important features of the 
new anti-terrorism regime (Law 431/2001 and Law 155/2005).
46
  
In the United Kingdom there is no distinction between administrative or judicial interceptions, which 
is comparable to the French or Italian models. Interception of telecommunications is regulated under 
the Regulation of Investigatory Power Act (RIPA) 2000.
47
 This Act establishes the legal regime for 
different surveillance techniques.
48
 In doing so, it takes into account not only the latest technological 
developments but also the ECHR and the related case law.
49
   
The most important aspect of regulation in this context is that intercepted conversations are not 
admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings.
50
 Interception of telecommunications can be used for 
investigative purposes and as an instrument for crime prevention (information gathering) but not for 
prosecution. The contents of interception of telecommunications may provide the police with lines of 
enquiry but may not be used as evidence in a public court.
51
 Nevertheless, because the restrictions 
under s. 17 RIPA apply only to interception conducted in the United Kingdom, communications 
lawfully intercepted by foreign authorities in their own jurisdictions may be adduced in evidence in 
the UK court.
52
 
It is noteworthy that, in the three countries, wiretapping or interception of telecommunications without 
legal authorisation is an offence.
53
  
After this general presentation, the comparative study focuses on the actors involved in the 
interception for either authorisation or execution purposes, its scope and duration. 
Differences exist between ante- (mainly administrative) and post-delictum (mainly judicial) 
interceptions. Interceptions of telecommunications have been first developed for investigative 
                                                     
 
45 G. Melillo, “La ricerca della prova tra clausole generali e garanzie costituzionali: il caso della disciplina delle 
intercettazioni nei procedimenti relativi a ‘delitti di criminalità organizzata’”, (1997) Cassazione Penale 3512.   
46 e.g. F. Caprioli, ‘Le disposizioni in materia di intercettazioni e perquisizioni’ in G. Di Chiara (ed), Il processo penale tra 
politiche della sicurezza e nuovi garantismi, Giappichelli (Torino 2003).   
47 e.g. D. Ormerod and S. McKay, “Telephone intercepts and their admissibility” (2004) Criminal Law Review 15; P 
Mirfield, ‘RIPA 2000: Part 2: Evidential Aspects’ (2001) Criminal Law Review 91; M Ryder, ‘RIPA reviewed’,(2008) 4 
Archbold News 6; Sir J. Chilcot, ‘Privy Council Review of intercept as evidence: report to the Prime Minister and the 
Home Secretary’, Chilcot Review (Cm 7324 2008). 
48 The investigatory powers regulated by RIPA 2000 are: the interception of communications, the acquisition of 
communications data (eg telephone billing data), intrusive surveillance (on residential premises or private vehicles), 
covert surveillance during specific operations, the use of covert human intelligence sources (agents, informants and 
undercover agents) and access to encrypted data. 
49 RIPA (ch.1, s. 5) introduced numerous changes in the Interception of Communications Act (IOCA) 1985, which had been 
enacted in response to the condemnation of the United Kingdom by the Strasbourg Court in the Malone case (Malone v. 
UK (1984)). In that case the Strasbourg Court made it clear that the existing rules and practices in the United Kingdom 
did not satisfy the requirement of art. 8 ECHR that any interference with a person’s privacy by a public authority should 
be ‘in accordance with the law’. 
50 This ban has long been the most controversial feature of the interception legal regime. At present, neither the government 
nor civil libertarians seem to be particularly concerned by the intrusion into personal privacy, as similar kinds of evidence 
(covert agents, bugging, eavesdropping, video-surveillance) are already admissible in court, even where not authorised, 
without any particular practical difficulty.  
51 s. 15(3) and 17 RIPA. See JUSTICE, Intercept evidence: Lifting the ban, Report (October 2006).  
52 R. v. Aujla [1998] 2 Cr App R 16 approved by the House of Lords in R. v. P. [2001] 2 WLR 463. 
53 arts. 615, 617, 617bis, 623bis CP. 
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purposes and then also used for preventive purposes. Therefore, the analysis will starts with the first 
one and then continue with the second one. 
Post-delictum interceptions 
Actors 
With regard to actors, two issues are worth comparing: who authorises the interceptions and who 
executes them.  
France  
In most cases of post-delictum interceptions, the authorisation is given by a judicial authority both in 
France
54
 and in Italy
55
.  
In terms of existing derogation, it is noteworthy that in France, Law 204/2004 extended the possibility 
to use judicial interceptions to preliminary and in flagrante police investigations (i.e. to cases where 
no instruction has been yet instituted) for a limited number of serious offences listed in art. 706(73) 
CPP. According to art. 706(95) CPP, these kinds of interception are requested by the prosecutor, 
authorised and supervised by the juge des libertés et de la détention (JLD), and carried out by the 
police officers (police judiciaire). These operations and recordings are subjects to a statement (procès-
verbal) written by the police.  
This is the technique most often used by the JIRS (juridictions inter-régionales spécialisées)
56
 for the 
purpose of investigation and prosecution of the crimes listed in article 706(73) CPP, the most serious 
offences, usually committed by an organised group.
57
 
Italy 
In the Italian regime, the interception warrant is issued by the judge for preliminary investigations 
(giudice per le indagini preliminary, GIP) upon the request of the prosecutor.
58
 However, when the 
measure is motivated by emergency
59
, the prosecutor may act without the prior authorisation of the 
judge.  
In ordinary cases, the interception is authorised by a reasoned decision where there are serious grounds 
(gravi indizi) to believe that a crime has been committed and it is absolutely indispensible for the 
purposes of the investigation.
60
 However, the GIP – who is formally in charge of keeping these 
proceedings under scrutiny – is unaware of the facts grounding the investigation. So it is difficult for 
                                                     
 
54 art. 100 and ff CPP.  
55 art. 266 and ff CPP. 
56 The JIRS, created by Law 204/2004, bring together prosecutors and judges of the instruction and are specialised in 
organised crime, financial crime, but also in complex cases justifying significant investigation. 
57 J. Pradel and J. Dallest, La criminalité organisée – Droit français, droit international et droit comparé, Litec, (2012) 
p.144. 
58 art. 267 CPP. 
59 art. 267(2) CPP. 
60 F. Galluzzo, “Spunti di riflessione in tema di intercettazioni” (2010) 9 Cass pen 3141. 
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him to assess the seriousness of the file.
61 
In addition, the prosecutor can exceptionally authorise 
interceptions when there is some urgency.
62
 
After having been authorised, judicial interceptions must be carried out by the office of the prosecutor, 
but the measure may also be executed by the police under the supervision of the prosecutor.
63
  
The United Kingdom 
By contrast, in the United Kingdom, there is no distinction between ante- and post-delictum, thus the 
interception is always authorised by an administrative authority, and not a judicial one. There is a 
limited number of persons by whom, or on behalf of whom, the applications for issue of interception 
warrants may be made and all interception warrants are issued by the Secretary of State or by a senior 
official in urgent cases and where there is a request for international mutual assistance.
64
 
Nevertheless some features of the regime are of interest. Under sections 5–8 RIPA at the request of 
authorised officials,
65
 the Secretary of State may lawfully grant an interception warrant only if the 
existence of certain limited grounds are satisfied and only if necessary and proportionate.
66
 The police 
act under this warrant. As underlined by Prof. Spencer, “in all three parts of the United Kingdom 
warrants to intercept communications are issued not by judges, but by ministers: usually the Home 
Secretary. Neither they nor their civil servants wish the legality or propriety of their decisions to issue 
warrants to be scrutinised by judges in any prosecutions that might follow, and to avoid this, prefer a 
situation in which the fruit of the intercept can only be used as “operational material”, even though this 
is a dreadful obstacle to prosecution.”67 
Scope 
France 
Regarding the scope of the measure, in France, whereas “ordinary” interception is possible for any 
crime or délit punishable with a minimum sentence of two years of imprisonment, the post-delictum 
interception allowed by art. 706(95) CPP is possible only in case of offences listed in article 706(73) 
CPP, namely the most serious offences linked to organised crime (e.g. murder committed “en bande 
organisée”) and in compliance with the necessity and proportionality of the use of such technique.68  
It is noteworthy that police officers may extend the surveillance to the whole territory after informing 
the prosecutor (no agreement is required but the prosecutor can object), if there are one or several 
                                                     
 
61 See D. Siracusano and others, Diritto processuale penale Vol II, Giuffrè (Milano 2006) pp. 151-52.  
62 The prosecutor must within 24 hours ask for validation by the judge (art. 267-2 CPP) who has to decide on the validity of 
the measure within 48 hours. If the authorisation is not validated within the prescribed period, the interception has to stop 
and the results cannot be used.    
63 art. 268(3) CPP. 
64 art. 6(2) and 7(2) RIPA 2000.  
65 e.g. Chiefs Constable, Chiefs of the Intelligence and Security Services, Director of Government Communication 
Headquarters, Director General of the National Criminal Intelligence Service; s. 6(2) RIPA 2000. 
66 s. 5(3) RIPA 2000. 
67 J.R. Spencer, “No thank you, we’ve already got one, Why EU anti-terrorist legislation has made little impact on the law of 
the UK”, in Galli and Weyembergh (eds.), EU Counter-terorrism offences, p. 129. 
68 ECHR, Huvig and Kruslin v. France, 11105/84 [1990] ECHR 9, 24 April 1990 ; ECHR, Lambert v. France, 1998-V, n°86, 
24 August 1998; ECHR, Matheron v. France, 57752/00, 29 March 2005.  
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plausible reasons to suspect someone of having committed one of the crimes and misdemeanours of 
the article 706(73).
69
   
Italy 
In Italy, post-delictum interceptions may be used in relation to most serious offences, such as 
intentional crimes punishable with imprisonment with a maximum penalty of at least five years (art. 
266(1) CPP).  
A specific regime applicable for organised crime was introduced in article 13 of Law 203/1991 and, 
then extended to terrorist cases by article 3 Law 438/2001 and more recently to human trafficking by 
article 9 Law 228/2003. 
Three main derogations are thus introduced to the ordinary regime. Firstly, an interception can be 
authorised where there are sufficient (as against “serious”) grounds (sufficienti indizi) for believing 
that a crime has been committed.
70
 Secondly, interceptions need only to be necessary (rather than 
indispensable) for investigative purposes. Thirdly, the interception may aim at developing new 
investigative paths (rather than being merely employed in the course of an already established 
investigation). 
In addition, article 6 of Law 438/2001 extends the authorisation of the use of interception of 
telecommunications (intercettazioni ambientali) to seek out fugitives.
71
 
The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, by contrast to what have been said in the section on actors, a difference exists 
in relation to whether they are in the context of a prevention or investigation of offences. During the 
investigation phase, when law enforcement agents are gathering information, the methods used depend 
on the complexity of and not on the gravity of any suspected offence. Interception without a warrant is 
possible if one party consents and if surveillance by means of interception has been authorised under 
RIPA provisions.  
Duration 
Provisions concerning the duration of the measure are also different for ante-delictum or post-
delictum interceptions.  
France 
Concerning post-delictum interceptions, in France, in ordinary cases, the juge d’instruction may 
authorise the interception for a maximum period of four months. Such an initial period can, however, 
be extended as long as necessary for investigative purposes.
72
 However, in the framework of the fight 
against the most serious crimes, the JLD may, at the request of the prosecutor, authorise the 
interception for a maximum period of one month, renewable once under the same conditions of form 
                                                     
 
69 art. 706-80 CPP. 
70 Note that following the enactment of Law 63/2001 on due process, information resulting from police informers or security 
services are not admissible for this purpose (art 203(1) CPP). 
71 art. 295(3) CPP. 
72 art. 100(2) CCP. 
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and duration.
73
 Finally, the procès-verbaux are destroyed at the behest of the prosecutor and at the 
expiry of the limitation period for the public action.
74
 
Italy 
Post-delictum interceptions, in Italy, can last for up to fifteen days, renewable as many times as the 
reasons for the initial decision exist and upon authorisation of the judge for preliminary 
investigations.
75
 Interceptions in terrorist and organised crime cases can last for up to forty days 
(rather than fifteen)
76
, renewable for subsequent periods of twenty days (rather than fifteen), when the 
reasons for the initial decision still exist.
77
 There is no limit on the number of possible renewals. In 
case of emergency, the renewal can be authorised by the prosecutor and then validated by the judge, 
who has to verify the existence of urgency. 
The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, according to RIPA 2000, the duration of the initial interception warrant was 
originally meant to be of three months at most, although renewable. The Terrorism Act 2006 has 
amended RIPA so that the duration of the initial interception warrant issued in the interests of national 
security is extended to six months and it is renewable at any time before the end of the relevant period 
for another six-month period.
78
 
Post-delictum interceptions 
 
 France Italy United Kingdom 
Ground 1 
 
Crimes and délits 
(max penalty ≥ 2 
years) 
Crimes (max penalty ≥ five 
years (art. 266(1) CPP) 
Complexity of the offence; 
only if necessary and 
proportionate 
Authorisation Juge d'instruction 
(art. 100 CPP)  
Prosecutor after 
authorisation of the judge 
for preliminary 
investigation (art. 267 
CPP); in the case of 
emergency, authorisation 
from the prosecutor 
Secretary of State or by a 
senior official in urgent cases 
and where there is a request for 
international mutual assistance 
Duration 4 months 15 days 6 months (Terrorism Act 
2006) 
Renewal no limit no limit no limit 
Ground 2 Suspicious deaths organised crime (art. 13 
Law 203/1991); extended 
 
                                                     
 
73 art. 706(95) CPP. An amendment to Loi d’orientation et de programmation pour la performance de la sécurité intérieure 
was adopted on 9 September 2010 on the initial deadline of 15 days changed to one month. The interception may last 
shorter than in oreinary cases because it is not requested by the juge d’instruction but simply at the request of the 
prosecutor and the judicial guarantees are thus more limited.  
74 Cass. Crim., 21 February 2007, BC 55, p. 304. The rule is not applicable to the procès-verbaux of the transcription of 
interceptions, which are procedural pieces.  
75 art. 267(3) CPP.  
76 art. 13 Law 203/1991. 
77 art. 13 Law Decree 152/1991, converted into Law 203/1991. 
78 s. 32 TA 2006.  
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or disappearances  to terrorist cases by art. 3 
Law 438/2001 and more 
recently to human 
trafficking (art. 9 Law 
228/2003) 
Authorisation Juge d'instruction 
(art.80(4) CPP) 
prosecutor   
Duration 2 months 40 days (art. 13 Law 
203/1991) 
 
Renewal no limit 20 days each renewal (art. 
13 Law 203/1991) 
 
Ground 3 Hunting of an 
individual on the 
run  
  
Authorisation Public prosecutor 
under the authority 
of the JLD (arts. 
74(2), 695(36) and 
696(21) CPP) 
  
Duration 2 months   
Renewal Renewable in the 
limit of 6 months 
for ordinary 
offences 
(correctionnelle) 
  
Ground 4 Organised crime   
Authorisation Public prosecutor 
under the authority 
of the JLD (art. 
706(95) CPP) 
  
Duration 1 month   
Renewal once renewable   
 
Ante-delictum interceptions 
Actors 
France 
Regarding the administrative interception of telecommunications, in France, the use of these means 
is possible after a written and motivated decision by the Prime Minister. This authorisation is given on 
the proposal of the Minister of Defence, Minister of the Interior or of the Minister of Customs.
79
 This 
                                                     
 
79 art. L 242-1 CSI.  
The use of surveillance technologies for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of serious crime 
14 
decision is sent immediately to the Commission nationale de contrôle des interceptions de sécurité, 
which ensures compliance with procedural rules.
80
  
With regards to the execution of these means, an interesting feature in France concerns the execution 
of administrative interceptions and their transcription, which relies upon “les personnels habilités” 
(authorised personnel)
81
 and thus implies a police officer (not necessarily police judiciaire) or a 
special named judge.  
Italy 
In Italy, in the case of ante-delictum interception, the Ministry of Interior
82
 has general competence to 
apply for an interception for both organised crime and terrorism offences.
83
 The warrant is issued by 
the prosecutor of the district that authorises the interception when the prevention interception is 
justified by enough elements of investigation and when it is necessary.
84
 This interception may be 
done under the initiative of the law enforcement services and not only at the initiative of the 
prosecutor. In order to allow systematic scrutiny of the operations, the equipment to intercept the 
communications is physically located within the prosecutor’s office. Law 155/2005 established a 
wider range of circumstances enabling the relevant authority to implement interceptions. In order to 
foster investigative and intelligence activities, the head of security and intelligence services (SISMI 
and SISDE) – acting after being delegated to do so by the Prime Minister – may apply to the 
prosecutor for an interception warrant whenever they are deemed to be necessary to prevent terrorist 
activities or subversion of the constitutional order ex art. 226 disp. att. CPP.
85
 The legislator has thus 
attributed to the executive an important role in the political coordination of intelligence activities but 
has also placed a powerful new instrument in the hands of the security services.
86
 
The United Kingdom 
As previously said, the interception is always authorised by an administrative authority. According to 
the purpose of the interception and the degree of intrusion into the privacy, the level of authorisation is 
higher. 
Scope 
France 
In France, ante-delictum interceptions are only used in exceptional cases as the research of 
information concerning national security
87
, safeguarding essential elements of the scientific and 
                                                     
 
80 See the reports of the Commission nationale des interceptions de sécurité in La documentation française. 
81 art. L 242(5) CSI. 
82 Or, on his mandate, the central bodies of the police forces, the “questore”, the province commander of the Carabineers and 
of the Guardia di Finanza. From the sole interpretation of the legislation one cannot understand whether these authorities 
can act autonomously.  
83 Whereas the director of the national Anti-Mafia Directorate has a role limited to organised crime offences.  
84 M.-L. Cesoni (ed.), Nouvelles méthodes de lutte contre la criminalité: La normalisation de l’exception, p. 196. Art. 5 Law 
438/2001 provides for this possibility with wide discretion respecting to the ordinary regime. 
85 J.A.E. Vervaele, “Special procedural measures and the protection of human rights, General report”, (2009) 5(2) Utrecht L 
Rev. 
86 On intelligence services’ competence and organisation see Law 801/1977 as amended by Law 207/2007.   
87 See Commission nationale de contrôle des interceptions de sécurité, Annual report, 2009, 18th ed., Paris, La 
documentation française, p. 39 and ff. 
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economic potential of France, the prevention of terrorism, of crime and organised crime or prevention 
of reconstitution or of maintaining of outlawed groups.
88
 The Prime Minister motivates their use and 
“fishing expeditions”89 are not allowed. 
Italy 
In Italy, ante-delictum interceptions are allowed to gather information when it is necessary for the 
prevention of organised crime, terrorism offences and human trafficking.  
The extension of preventive interception is, in principle, offset by a more rigorous application of the 
rule of the inability to use the information within the criminal process
90
, but only for investigative 
purposes. They are neither to be mentioned in investigative acts nor to be further disseminated
 
by oral 
deposition or any other means.
91
 They can be used as an element of a notitia criminis on which a 
prosecutor can start an investigation.
92
 In addition, although the intercepted material cannot ground 
any other act or investigative tool, it can lead the police to the development of further autonomous 
investigations. Revealing this information is heavily penalised under Italian law.
93
 
The United Kingdom  
It is remarkable that in the United Kingdom, the use of interception of telecommunications is justified 
by the complexity of an offence and not by its seriousness. Hence the margin of appreciation of 
intelligence services and police in using this means is much broader.  
For preventive purposes, the police can carry out telephone tapping in four situations: (1) in the 
interests of national security, (2) for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, (3) for the 
purpose of safeguarding the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, (4) or in circumstances 
appearing to the Secretary of State to be equivalent to those in which he would issue a warrant by 
virtue of paragraph (b), of giving effect to the provisions of any international mutual assistance 
agreement.
94
  
Duration 
France 
By contrast, in the case of administrative interceptions in France the authorisation is given for four 
months, renewable.
95
 The recording is destroyed a maximum of ten days after the date on which it was 
                                                     
 
88 art. L 241(2) CSI. 
89 A fishing expedition is a proactive action with surveillance technologies ; a speculative demand for information without a 
suspect, any real expectation about the outcome of the demand or its relevance to the investigation, where there is 
insufficient evidence to justify the issuing of a search warrant.  
90 art. 226(5) disp. att. CPP as modified by art. 5(5) Law 438/2001. See G. Melillo, ‘Le recenti modifiche alla disciplina’ 
(2002) Cass pen 904, 911; F. Ruggieri, Divieti probatori e inutilizzabilità nelle intercettazioni telefoniche, Giuffrè 
(Milano, 2001); C. Conti, “Intercettazioni e inutilizzabilità” (2011) 10 Cass pen 638; P. Sechi, “Intercettazioni e 
procedimento di prevenzione” (2011) 3 Cass pen 1082; S. Beltrani, “Intercettazioni inutilizzabili e procedimento di 
prevenzione” (2010) 9 Cass pen 2093. 
91 Two new criminal offences have been created in order to prosecute individuals who disseminate the intercepted material or 
the name of the officials involved in the proceedings.  
92 Cass. pen. 29 October 1998; Cass. pen. 10 November 2000.  
93 Vervaele, “Special procedural measures and the protection of human rights, General report” p. 94. 
94 s. 5 RIPA 2000. 
95 art. L242(3) CSI. 
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made.
96
 The transcripts of the recordings are destroyed once their storage is no longer necessary for 
the aforementioned preventive purposes.
97
 A report of each operation is drafted, which mentions the 
date and time when the interception started and ended.  
Italy 
In Italy for ante-delictum interceptions, operations can last for a maximum of forty days, subject to 
subsequent renewals of twenty days each, where the legal requirements still exist (as confirmed by the 
prosecutor in his written motivated application).
98
 Preventive interceptions must end once a criminal 
activity becomes manifest (notitia criminis).
99
 However, the law does not limit the number of available 
renewals. Intercepted material and all copies, extracts and summaries identified as the product of an 
interception, must be securely destroyed as soon as they are no longer needed for any of the authorised 
purposes. 
The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the duration of interception is the same than for investigative purposes: six 
months renewable.  
Ante-delictum interceptions 
 
 France Italy United Kingdom 
Ground Prevention of 
terrorism, crime and 
organised crime; 
national security; 
scientific and 
economic protection; 
outlawed groups  
Prevention of organised 
crime, terrorism 
offences and human 
trafficking 
(1) Interests of national security, 
(2) prevention or detection of 
serious crime, (3) safeguard of 
the economic wellbeing of the 
United Kingdom, (4) or in 
circumstances appearing to the 
Secretary of State to be 
equivalent to those in which he 
would issue a warrant by virtue 
of paragraph (b), of giving effect 
to the provisions of any 
international mutual assistance 
agreement (RIPA 2000) 
Authorisation Prime Minister (art. 
L242-2 CSI); 
proposal of the 
Minister of Defence, 
Minister of the 
Interior or of the 
Minister of Customs.   
Ministry of Interior has 
a general competence; 
prosecutor of the 
disctrict authorises when 
there are enough 
elements of 
investigation and when 
it is necessary 
Secretary of State or by a senior 
official in urgent cases and 
where there is a request for 
international mutual assistance 
Duration 4 months 40 days 6 months (Terrorism Act 2006) 
                                                     
 
96 art. L242(6) CSI. 
97 art. L242(7) CSI. 
98 art. 226 CPP. For the purpose of an increased transparency, the requirement of a written motivated application represents a 
novelty of the Law. 
99 At this point, the file is transferred to the Public Prosecutor who may decide to open a judicial investigation.  
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Renewal no limits (art. L 
242(3) CSI) 
20 days each renewal 
(art. 226 CPP) 
no limits 
Particular comments 
After this comparative analysis, some remarks can already be formulated.  
Firstly, it is remarkable that both for judicial (ordinary cases or organised crime/terrorism offences) 
and administrative interceptions, the duration of a warrant is much shorter in Italy than in the other 
two countries. However there is no limit to the available number of renewals.  
Secondly, specific elements of evolution can be underlined for each country. In France, judicial 
interceptions have long been available for both minor and serious offences. Organised crime and 
terrorism have played a catalysing effect in the introduction of derogatory provisions and in the 
expansion of powers of actors involved in either the authorisation or the execution process. Primarily 
introduced for the purpose of preventing and investigating terrorism and organised crime, the scope of 
these provisions was then extended to cover also other types of crimes of less serious nature.
100
  
In Italy, over time the use of the judicial interception of telecommunications has expanded both for the 
ordinary and derogatory regimes (i.e. the use of interceptions is possible in a wider number of cases 
and more easily authorised). This trend is a clear result of the catalysing effect of serious crime as the 
provisions under analysis are encompassed in legislation focusing on organised crime (e.g. Law 
152/1991) and terrorism (e.g. Law 438/2001). The same trend can be easily identified in relation to the 
provisions on ante-delictum interceptions (e.g. art. 5 Law 438/2001 on terrorism, art. 13 Law 
203/1991 on organised crime and art. 9 Law 228/2003 on human trafficking).
101
  
The regime in the United Kingdom is particularly different from the French and Italian one (e.g. there 
is no distinction between judicial and administrative interceptions). However, as in the other two 
countries, serious crime broadens the possibility of using this technology, leads to the multiplication of 
actors who can authorise and execute interceptions (e.g. SOCA), enlarges the scope and extends the 
duration in terrorism and organised crime cases.  
From a preventive purpose to an investigative use: video-surveillance 
In relation to video-surveillance, the three regimes analysed are quite similar. Most importantly video-
surveillance was at first introduced in the three countries by the private sector and then by public 
authorities (especially at the local level) for public order, prevention purposes. The question arising 
over time has been to understand whether and how videos and images so gathered can be used for 
investigation and prosecution purposes.  
In France, the legal regime of video-surveillance now called vidéoprotection systems is mainly 
regulated by the Code de la Sécurité Intérieure.
102
 A section of the Code focuses on video-protection 
                                                     
 
100 See development of art. 706(73) CPP over time.  
101 In the last years, many scandals concerning illegally obtained interceptions and their subsequent publication by 
newspapers have revealed how the current regime is too easily subject to abuses. Thus, a reform of the legislative 
framework has been discussed. Disegno di Legge 1415, “Norme in materia di intercettazioni telefoniche, telematiche e 
ambientali” (30 giugno 2008). See F. Ruggieri, “Il Disegno di legge governativo sulle intercettazioni: poche note positive 
e molte perplessità” (2008) 6 Cass pen 2239. 
102 e.g. E. Heilmann and P. Melchior, Vidéo-surveillance ou vidéo-protection ?, Le choc des idées, Le Muscadier, Paris, 
2012; A. Bauer and F. Freynet, Vidéosurveillance et vidéoprotection, Que sais-je ? PUF, 2012; A. Bauer and C. Soullez, 
Les politiques publiques de sécurité, Que sais-je? PUF (Paris 2011); F. Ocqueteau, “A comment on video-surveillance in 
France: regulation and impact on crime” (2001) 25(1/2) International journal of comparative and applied criminal justice 
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in general
103
 and another section is rather devoted to the fight against terrorism
104
. Since its 
introduction by Law 73/1995
105
, the use of this technology in the public sphere has become 
particularly important for anti-terrorism purposes as a tool to gather evidence when an offence is 
actually committed.
106
    
In Italy, the fight against terrorism has led to a redefinition of priorities, objectives and instruments by 
national agencies, which significantly stimulated the use of new technologies. This lead to a larger 
deployment of video-surveillance systems (videosorveglianza) for crime and terrorism prevention 
purposes as a response to citizens’ anxiety and need of reassurance.107  
Video-surveillance is allowed only under certain conditions. In the public sphere, it is governed by 
specific data protection rules as detailed by art. 34 of the Code for data protection
108
 and by the 
decision of 8 April 2010
109
 of the Italian data protection authority. 
“For the past 25 years, the United Kingdom has experienced an exponential increase in these 
technologies and is now the world leader in the use of video surveillance”. 110 There are few 
restrictions on the use of cameras in public areas.
111
 It is noteworthy that there is no specific statutory 
provision for video surveillance but only a CCTV code of practice, issued by the Information 
Commissioner’s Office.112 Such a code encompasses recommendations and not mandatory provisions. 
General video surveillance with CCTV operations does not need to be authorised under RIPA 2000. 
However, pre-planned, covert operations to follow known individuals for investigation purposes, 
which involve the use of CCTV, need authorisation. Members of the public need to be made aware 
that such systems are in use, and their operation is especially covered by the Data Protection Act 1998 
and the CCTV Code of Practice. 
As in relation to interceptions, three elements may be used to highlight similarities and differences of 
the legal regimes in the three countries: the actors, the scope and the duration of video-surveillance.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
 
103; N.C. Ahl, “La vidéo-surveillance en trompe-l’oeil”, Le Monde, (29 October 2011); E. Heilmann, “La vidéo-
surveillance, un mirage technologique et politique” in L. Mucchielli, La frénésie sécuritaire, La decouverte (Paris, 2008); 
N. Le Blanc, “Le bel avenir de la vidéosurveillance de voie publique” (2010) 2(62) Mouvements 32; T Le Goff, 
“Politique de securité: les chiffres et les impages, (2010) 3 Esprit 90; C. Laval, “Surveiller et prevenir” (2012) 2 revue du 
MAUSS 47. See also the reports of CNIL (commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés).  
103 arts. L251(1) to L255(1). 
104 arts. L223(1) to L223(9). 
105 Law 73/1995. 
106 J. Pradel, Procédure pénale, 16th ed., Cujas (Paris, 2011) p. 407.  
107 I sistemi di videosorveglianza 2, Videosorveglianza e privacy: quadro normativo, casistica e aspetti tecnici, Transcrime, 
Inforsicurezza (4 May 2006) p.11. 
108 Legislative Decree 196/2003 bearing the adoption of the Codice in material di protezione dei dati personali.  
109 Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, Provvedimento in material di videosorveglianza, G.U. 99 (29 April 2010).  
110 EFUS, Citizens, Cities and video-survellance, Towards a democratic and responsible use of CCTV, EFUS press (Paris, 
2010) p. 14. 
111 On the United Kingdom regime, on CCTV cameras in relation to terrorism prevention see e.g. Q.A.M. Eijkman and D. 
Weggemans, “Visual surveillance and the prevention of terrorism: What about the checks and balances? »; D. Fenwick, 
“Terrorism, CCTV and the Freedom Bill 2011: Achieving compatibility with Article 8 ECHR?” and B. Sheldon, “Camera 
surveillance within the UK: Enhancing public safety or a social threat?” in H. Fenwick, Developments in Counter-
Terrorist Measures and Uses of Technology, Rouledge (2012); D Giannoulopoulos, « La vidéosurveillance au Royaume-
Uni. La caméra omniprésente », (2010) 1 Archives de politique criminelle 245.  
112 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 specifically requires the Secretary of State to prepare a code of practice containing 
guidance on the development of surveillance camera systems and the use of processing of images or other information 
obtained by virtue of such system. It also appoints a person as the Surveillance Camera Commissioner in order to 
encourage compliance with the surveillance camera code, review its operation and provide advice about the code 
(including changes to it or breaches of it).  
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Actors 
In terms of actors, unlike in Italy, in France and in the United Kingdom, both the installation and the 
use of video-surveillance is authorised by an administrative authority.  
France 
In France, vidéoprotection can be authorised to ensure security when the places and buildings are 
especially exposed to a risk of assault and theft
113
 and only if vidéoprotection does record neither the 
interior of dwellings and private buildings nor their entrances.
114
 When the images gathered allow the 
identification of an individual, their use must comply with provisions of Law 17/1978 on data 
protection.  
This measure is submitted to the authorisation of the Préfet, which can be made at any time by arrêté 
préfectoral, after consulting the Commission départementale.
115
 It prescribes all necessary precautions, 
especially about the status of the persons in charge of the exploitation of the video-protection system 
or viewing images.
116
 The authorisation is given to certain categories only, identified in relation to a 
specific case only, namely police agents and gendarmerie. It specifies the method of transmission and 
the duration of conservation of images. The Commission départementale de vidéoprotection gives an 
opinion on the implementation of such a technology, if these cameras are filming public roads or 
places or establishments open to the public.
117
 
Yet, for the purpose of preventing terrorist acts, the representative of the State in the Department and, 
in Paris, the Préfet of police may prescribe the implementation of vidéoprotection systems and 
authorise also a broader category of individuals to view and use images.
118
  
In urgent cases and in particular when under exposure to the risk of terrorist acts, the representative of 
the State in the Department and, in Paris, the Préfet of police may issue, without prior notice to the 
Commission départementale de vidéoprotection, provisional authorisation to install a video-protection 
system. The Chairman of the Commission will be informed of this decision so that the Commission 
provides its opinion.
119
 
In order to best reconcile security needs and the right to privacy, ethics committees have been 
introduced. An institution, solely established for this purpose, monitors video-protection, in some 
French cities such as Lyon and Le Havre, with the specific aim of ensuring the respect of freedoms.
120
  
For investigative purposes, a police officer can have access to the information gathered by video-
protection via an ordinary judicial warrant (prosecutor or judge on the basis of specific provisions). 
                                                     
 
113 art. L 251(2) CSI as introduced by Law 267/2011 that explains the purpose of video-protection. DC 2011-625, 10 March 
2011. 
114 art. L 251(3) CSI. 
115 art.  L 252(2) and L 252(3) CSI. 
116 art. L 252(1). 
117 art. L 251(4) CSI; the Commission nationale de vidéoprotection created by Law 2011/267 has a mission of advice and 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the video-protection at the level of the Ministry of Interior. 
118 art. L 223(2) CSI; see also J.-P. Courtois and C. Gautier, Rapport d’information sur la vidéosurveillance, Senate, n°131, 
10 December 2008. 
119 art. L223-4 and L223-5 CSI. 
120 EFUS, Citizens, Cities and video surveillance, pp.141-142. 
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The United Kingdom 
The use of CCTV cameras, in the United Kingdom, was motivated by the will to fight against street 
crime around shopping malls and stadium. Originally managed at the local level, it became a national 
policy thus engendering a need to coordinate local activities and favour the share of information.
121
 
CCTV cameras are overt and do not constitute intrusive and directed surveillance
122
 (unless they focus 
on a specific group of people or individual and thus record movement and activities of a private 
person) and thus do not require an authorisation under Part II of RIPA 2000.  
In the case where they are used as law enforcement activities, authorisation must be obtained, setting 
out what is authorised, how it will be carried out (e.g. which cameras are to be used), and what activity 
is to be caught and held on the tape or disk that results. Authorising officers have to take into account 
the risk of collateral intrusion into the privacy of persons who are not the subjects of the investigation. 
Italy 
By contrast, in Italy, since Law 38/2009, municipalities may use video-surveillance systems in order 
to guarantee urban security in public area
123
 for public order purposes.  
The Municipal Police manages the installation with the help of technicians from a private company 
and with the advice of the National Police. The National Police, the Municipal Police and the 
Carabinieri control the cameras. When the images are sent to the operator in the National Police 
Headquarters, they can, on the one hand, view the images from all cameras and, on the other hand, 
control the cameras remotely. The choice of operators is limited by national legislation to judicial 
police officers. 
In the Municipal Police’s video surveillance central operations office, three police officers work 
relayed shifts to ensure 24 hours coverage. Meanwhile, in the National Police headquarters, a State 
Police Inspector and two assistants are on hand 24 hours a day.  
The images are sent simultaneously to the headquarters of both the national and municipal police 
forces. The National Police Headquarters can then send the images to the judicial authorities as items 
of evidence. In total, a dozen operators drawn from the national police, municipal police and 
Carabinieri consult images, which cannot be shared in real time with other services. Only agents of 
the judicial police can access the saved images, with the authorisation of a judge. To view the images, 
not only authorisation but also physically the key is needed. However, only the system manager has 
permission to consult the recordings and must use a specific access key. 
Scope 
In all these Member States, the scope of the use of video-surveillance technologies is crime 
prevention.  
France 
In France, vidéoprotection is built to record what happen in public area in order primarily to prevent
124
 
and then to investigate offences, whether serious or not. In fact, this instrument has been recently 
                                                     
 
121 ibid., pp.184-185. 
122 s. 26(2)(a)/1(2)(a) RIPA 2000, defining directed surveillance. 
123 art. 6(7) Law 38/2009. 
124 Law 125/1995 as amended by Ordonnance 351/2012. 
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extended to judicial investigation. The government announced that video-protection is an important 
component of urban safety policies. If video-protection was developed originally to fight against 
common offences,
125
 the anti-terrorism context mainly justified further development and 
multiplication of vidéoprotection. As mentioned above, specific provisions exist in the code (an actual 
separate section) in relation to video-surveillance for the prevention and investigation of terrorism. 
These derogatory provisions grant more powers and more margin of manoeuvre to the authorising
126
 
(larger number of circumstances justifying the installation) and executing authorities.  
There is no special offence motivating the use of video-protection but the transmission and recording 
images collected by this system are submitted to various conditions depending on the criminal context; 
the level of powers granted to authorities depends on the type of offences concerned. Terrorism 
extends the permitted space of video-protection to the immediate vicinity of buildings and facilities by 
other legal persons and places likely to be exposed to acts of terrorism.
127
 It can be carried out in 
exceptional circumstances and under strict conditions.  
Italy 
In Italy, video-surveillance have diverse purposes, some of which can be grouped into the following 
categories: “(1) protection and integrity of individuals – including urban security; public order; public 
bodies' prevention, detection and/or suppression of offences; streamlining and improving publicly 
available services also in order to enhance user safety; (2) protection of property; (3) detecting, 
preventing and controlling breaches of the law; (4) gathering of evidence.”128 
As in the other countries, the use of video-surveillance in urban transports (where it was most 
importantly installed at the beginning) has rapidly spread because of the terrorist threat.
129
 Its purpose 
remains the prevention of more petty crime but its use is extended to the prevention of and information 
gathering in relation to more serious offences, including terrorism.
130
  
The preventive aspect is less clear. Citizens’ satisfaction is nonetheless high, even if the system does 
not meet all the expectations. A greater surveillance gives citizens a feeling of greater protection, with 
the possibility of a more rapid response from the police. The displacement effects (relocation of 
criminal activities) are not quantifiable, due to a lack of reliable statistics. However, a research study 
claims that the message given to the public opinion was “+ video-surveillance = + prevention of 
offences = - criminality”.131 
The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, video-surveillance is used for a number of monitoring and surveillance 
purposes, but is mainly used for security purposes. The development of CCTV was felt by many to be 
                                                     
 
125 art.4 Law 73/1995.  Priority tasks of the police are for example the fight against urban violence and the control of public 
order.   
126 e.g. larger number of circumstances justifying the installation; the Préfet may authorise an installation before that the 
commission has given his advice.  
127 art. L223-1 and art. 223-2 CSI. 
128 Garante per la Protezione dei dati personali , Video surveillance, Decision (8 April 2010).  
129 I sistemi di videosorveglianza 2, Videosorveglianza e privacy: quadro normativo, casistica e aspetti tecnici, Provincia 
autonoma di Trento, Transcrime, Inforsicurezza (4 May 2006) p.49 
130 F. Caprioli, “Nuovamente al vaglio della Corte Costituzionale l’uso investigative degli strumenti di ripresa visiva”, (2008) 
3 Giur Cost 1832.  
131 See I sistemi di videosorveglianza 2, p.11. 
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a major breakthrough in crime prevention. It forms a major part of crime prevention strategy in the 
United Kingdom and is often used as important evidence in court trials and in the identification of 
suspects.
132
 CCTV may have other deterrence and safety-related benefits, although these are debated. 
However, its multiplication in the country is considered as an erosion of civil liberties.   
Duration 
With regard to the duration, two issues are of importance. On the one side, how long the authorisation 
given by the authority to deploy the video-surveillance system lasts; and, on the other side, how long 
the information gathered by the video-surveillance device can be retained for.  
Duration of the installation 
Concerning the length of deployment, only in France, the installation of video-surveillance devices 
lasts only to a limited amount of time: 5 years renewable. By contrast, in Italy and the United 
Kingdom, there is no duration limit to the deployment.  
Duration of the retention of information gathered by video-surveillance 
On the second issue, the situation of the Member States varies broadly. In all of them, information can 
be retained until they are no longer necessary. Besides, some jurisdictions provide for specific delays.  
France 
In France the authorisation prescribes the duration of retention of images within one month after the 
transmission or access to them, without prejudice to the necessity of their conservation for the needs of 
the criminal proceedings.
133
 Except in case of investigation of flagrante delicto, a preliminary 
investigation and an information judiciaire, the retention of images may not exceed one month.
134
 If 
the conditions of urgency and of exposure of the risk of terrorist acts are present, video-protection is 
installed for four months
135
 and the renewal is possible after a consultation of the Commission 
départementale de vidéoprotection.
136
  
Italy 
In Italy, concerning the video-surveillance devices installed by municipalities for public order 
purposes, the local and national Police can view the encrypted images and keep them for up to seven 
days until their destruction except if the information is subject to special needs for further storage.
137
 
However, the duration can be extended in places particularly exposed to terrorist threat up to thirty 
days.
138
 In cases where video-surveillance systems had been installed (e.g. by private individuals or 
companies) for other purposes than public order, data may be retained for a maximum of 24 hours.  
                                                     
 
132 Unlike the interception of telecommunication, which cannot be used as evidence at trial . 
133 art. L252-3 CSI  
134 art. L252-5 CSI 
135 art. L223-4 CSI 
136 art. L223-5 CSI. 
137 art. 6(8), Law 38/2009. In cases where video-surveillance systems had been installed (e.g. by private individuals or 
companies) for other purposes than public order, data may be retained for a maximum of 24 hours.  
138 Garante per la protezione dei dati persnali, Prescrizioni per la videosorveglianza presso i siti di interesse culturale 
maggiormente esposti alla minaccia terroristica (12 March 2009).  
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The United Kingdom 
Finally, in the United Kingdom, an indication on duration is provided in a non-statutory instrument, 
i.e. a code of practice. The indication is moreover extremely vague. According to the Code of practice, 
“[y]ou should not keep images for no longer than strictly necessary to meet your own purposes for 
recording them. On occasion, you may need to retain images for a longer period, where a law 
enforcement body is investigating a crime, to give them opportunity to view the images as part of an 
active investigation.”139 An example of duration is given, “images from a town centre system may 
need to be retained for enough time to allow crimes to come to light, for example, a month. The exact 
period should be the shortest possible, based on your own experience.”140 
Installation of video-surveillance 
 
 France Italy United Kingdom 
Ground 1 Security purposes/public order, 
especially for areas exposed to a 
risk of assault and theft but also 
to a risk of terrorism 
Security 
purposes/publi
c order 
Security purposes/public order 
Authorisation Representative of the State in 
the Department and, in Paris, 
Préfet of police after consulting 
the Commission départementale 
Municipalities 
 
Chiefs Constable, Chiefs of the 
Intelligence and Security 
Services, Director of 
Government Communication 
Headquarters, Director General 
of the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service 
Duration 5 years renewable no limit no limit 
Ground 2 In case of emergency   
Authorisation State in the Department and, in 
Paris, Préfet of police without 
consulting the Commission 
départementale (informed after) 
 
  
Duration 4 months renwable after 
consultation of the Commission 
départentale de la 
vidéoprotection 
  
 
 
Retention of information gathered by video-surveillance 
 
 France Italy United Kingdom 
Ground public order and investigation 
of crimes 
public order and 
investigation of 
Public order and 
investigation of any 
                                                     
 
139 CCTV code of practice, Data protection, Information Commissioner’s Office (revised ed. 2008) p. 14 
140 ibid. 
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crimes offences 
Authorisation police officer, prosecutor and 
judge 
law enforcement 
authorities 
law enforcement 
authorities 
Duration 1 month, without prejudice to 
the necessity of their 
conservation for the needs of 
the criminal proceedings; in 
flagrante delicto, no more than 
one month 
7 days; if gathered for 
other purposes than 
public order, retained 
for max 24 hours 
"no longer than 
necessary" 
The comparative analysis validates the second dimension of the first shift tested in this paper. In the 
three states under scrutiny, video-surveillance was at first introduced by private citizens and 
companies and then by public authorities (especially at the local level) for public order prevention 
purposes. The data gathered are now used in the context of the prevention and investigation of serious 
crimes, including terrorism.  
Interplay between intelligence services and law enforcement agencies: Mutual contamination 
According to a strict principle of separation, traditionally the activities of intelligence services and 
police authorities in the prevention and investigation of crime were clearly distinct. In fact, there is a 
profound difference (at least in general terms) in the specific purposes of the two bodies. The police, 
in its judicial function, have the task of gathering information in relation to a specific offence for 
prosecution purposes; intelligence services do not have the objective of investigating offences but 
rather to recognize threats and to provide intelligence assessments to policy makers. In this 
framework, intelligence information is mostly secret, whereas police information is subject to scrutiny 
via cross-examination in court. However, nowadays the distinction is not always so clear, intelligence 
is also given operational tasks and this leads to a problematic coordination and overlap.
141
  
The shift towards prevention in the fight against serious crimes, including terrorism, attributes a 
greater role to ductile means of intelligence to the detriment of more traditional means of 
investigation. The current trend leads to an intense and dangerous osmosis and blur between criminal 
justice and secret investigations (significantly much of the activities of the intelligence falls within the 
realm of State secret
142
). Intelligence activities and police investigations tend to converge as of their 
object, scope, means, particularly in relation to offences such as terrorism and organised crime where 
intelligence is crucial to understand at best the organisational dimensions of complex, widely spread 
and long-lasting phenomena which threaten national security.
143
  
In addition, intelligence must only be accountable in front of the executive. Given the new role of 
intelligence in public order activities and the investigative domain, the issue at stake is hence that of 
the relationship, yet to be defined, between intelligence and the judiciary. 
                                                     
 
141 The distinction of roles and information sharing between intelligence services and law enforcement authorities with a 
view of preventing an combating terrorism has been highly discussed and let to controversial case-law also in other UE 
countries such as the Netherlands. See J.A.E Vervaele, “Terrorism and information sharing between the intelligence and 
law enforcement communities in the US and the Netherlands: emergency criminal law? » (2005) 1(1) Utrecht Law 
Review 1. 
142 See, re. Italy, R. Orlandi, “Segreto di Stato e limiti alla sua opponibilità fra vecchia e nuova normativa” (2010) 6 Giur cost 
5224; A Pace, “L’apposizione del segreto di Stato nei principi costituzionali e nella legge n.124 del 2007, (2008) 5 Giur 
Cost 4041. 
143 See R. Orlandi, “Attività di intelligence e diritto penale della prevenzione” and F. Sommovigo, “Attività di intelligence e 
indagine penale” in G. Illuminati, Nuovi Profili.  
Francesca Galli and Céline C. Cocq 
25 
The second shift the authors are testing in this paper is thus the evolution, potentially leading to a blur, 
of the share of roles, competences and means of intelligence services and law enforcement authorities. 
The question to explore is whether, and to what extent, the three countries have established structures 
of coordination/centralisation between intelligence, police and judiciary in particular in the field of 
organised crime and terrorism in order to manage the overlap of competences and avoid the blur.  
France 
France constitutes, from a law enforcement perspective, a very effective example of coordination 
between intelligence services, police, prosecutors and juges d’instruction via its centralised 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offence and the coordination of organised crime cases in 
Paris.
144
  
Since the first anti-terrorist law in 1986, co-ordination between the various intelligence and police 
services and the French government has improved with the creation of the Unité de Co-ordination de 
la Lutte Anti-Terroriste and the 14
th
 section of the Parquet of Paris. By contrast, in the field of 
organised crime, there is no centralisation of prosecutions and trials but only a coordination of 
investigations.  
The new Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI), the French internal intelligence 
service, is the centralised agency responsible for the preventive and investigative phases. The DCRI
145
, 
operational since 1
st
 July 2008, combines law enforcement and intelligence service agents and is meant 
to monitor, detect and investigate individuals. Thus this service, which can be used by prosecutors and 
juge d’instruction in serious crime investigations, encompasses both police and intelligence agents. Its 
composition and structure favours the sharing of information both at the prevention and investigation 
phases between the two services in an effective and rapid manner, leading to the so-called 
“judiciarisation” of intelligence information.146 
Such a centralisation offers some advantages as it results in the competent judges and prosecutors 
being more specialised and in them having more knowledge and expertise in terrorist matters as well 
as the establishment of closer links with the intelligence services. However, at the same time, it has 
been considered as a dangerous concentration of very far-reaching powers in the hands of only a 
few.
147
  
Remarkably, no specific rule forbides the use of intelligence (including the information gathered via 
administrative interceptions) as evidence during criminal proceedings. However, in practice, 
intelligence services have never used so far the results of administrative interception at trial.
148
 
Intelligence can always be used as a lead for initiating judicial investigations. Moreover, despite the 
                                                     
 
144 The French system is currently evolving towards a centralisation of the execution and the consequent use of judicial 
interception based on the model of the centralised system of administrative interceptions (art. 4 Law 91/73). See plate-
forme nationale des interceptions judiciaires and Commission nationale de controle des interceptions de sécurité. 
145 Gathering of the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (DST) and of the Direction centrale des Renseignements 
Généraux (RG). 
146 Interview with P. Caillol, Deputy Director of the Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice (Paris, 
28 November 2012). 
147 L. Caprioli and J.-P. Pochon, “La France et le terrorisme international, Les racines historiques et organisationnelles du 
savoir policier”, round table organised by J. Ferret and A. Wuilleumier, (2004) 55 Cah. S.I., pp. 147-179; FIDH, Paving 
the way for arbitrary justice, (1999) 271(2).  
148 This is probably because the transcription of the interception is only possible for the purpose of article L241-2 CSI (art. 
L242-5). In addition, the recording is destroyed within ten days (art. L242-6) and the transcription within four months (L 
242-3). No article provides for any extension of preservation for judicial purpose. Information from P. Caillol, Deputy 
Director of the INHESJ (22 April 2013). 
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establishment of central coordination structures, the police sometimes do not trust the intelligence 
information received because they cannot have access to sources. In the Merah case, the sharing of 
information between the intelligence services and the police was particularly deficient; Merah was 
under surveillance by intelligence services but the information was never passed on to the police in 
order to start an investigation and thus arrest the suspect.
149
  
Italy 
A similar overlap and blur of competences between intelligences services and police authorities may 
be seen in Italy in relation to offences which threaten not only individual citizens but also national 
security. A number of legislative provisions thus increasingly involve intelligence services in public 
order policies. A good example is that of the Law 155/2005 enabling intelligence services to apply to 
the prosecutor for an interception warrant where deemed to be necessary to prevent terrorist activities 
or subversion of the constitutional order ex art. 226 disp. att. CPP.
150
  
Already Law 410/1991 established a general Council for the fight against organised crime, including 
intelligence service agents with the task of intelligence gathering in relation to any form of subversion 
by any type of organised group threatening institutions and public life.
151
 The intelligence agents had 
only an obligation to communicate to judicial police forces any information on Mafia organised crime 
groups.  
In addition, the Agenzia Informativa di Sicurezza Interna  (AISI) – created in 2007 to replace the 
SISMI – has a specific competence of information gathering in the domain of subversion, terrorism 
(particularly international terrorism) and organised crime offences. In these domains, a precise 
distinction of the field of intervention of police and intelligence is particularly complicated.
152
 
At the stages of pre-trial and trial, there is no centralisation of powers in the fight against serious 
offences. However, with a view to favoring effective prosecution of terrorist offences and valid 
judicial scrutiny of police investigations, a coordination of different cases to share knowledge and 
information on terrorist networks has certainly been considered fruitful. This has lead to a 
specialisation of investigating judges, prosecutors and the police. In relation to terrorism cases, during 
the 1970s and 1980s, informal networks for the prosecutors grew up in order to share information and 
competences. Judges have often advocated the establishment of coordination between prosecutors who 
would deal with terrorism offences under the auspices of the National Anti-Terrorism Directorate.
153
 
In relation to organised crime, judicial and police investigations, as well as preventive actions, are 
coordinated respectively by the National Anti-Mafia Directorate (DNA) and the Anti-Mafia 
Investigations Directorate (DIA). The coordination ensures information sharing between judicial 
authorities and police services among themselves and among each other on all investigations 
concerning organised crime. The DNA may directly rely upon the DIA in the case of specific 
investigations. However, the two Directorates do not directly involve members of the intelligence 
services.  
In 2004, a Comitato di Analisi strategica anti-terrorismo has been created within the Ministry of 
Interior to assess any information on international and domestic terrorist threats and thus coordinate 
any intervention. The agency involves members of police forces, carabineers, guardia di finanza and 
intelligence services. Law 207/2007 concerning the re-organisation of intelligence services establishes 
                                                     
 
149 Interview with T. Fragnoli, Procureur, Parquet anti-terrorisme, Tribunal de Grande Instance (Paris, 29 November 2012).  
150 Vervaele, “Special procedural measures and the protection of human rights, General report”, Utrecht L Rev. 
151 Law 410/1991.  
152 See Law 124/2007, art. 7. More information available at www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it (accessed 23 May 2013). 
153 G. Melillo and A. Spataro, “Senza la creazione di una Procura nazionale” (2005) 33 Guida Dir 48.  
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the Dipartimento delle Informazioni per la Sicurezza (DIS) which also coordinates the exchange of 
information between intelligence services and police authorities.  
For the purpose of improving the cooperation, Law 207/2007 has also introduced art. 118 bis CPP so 
that the Prime Minister may ask to the judiciary information which are relevant to the activities of the 
intelligence even in derogation to the secrecy of investigations (art. 329 CPP). Meanwhile, the 
judiciary may ask the intelligence services to obtain documents or information relevant to a judicial 
investigation (art. 256 bis CPP).  
The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the coordination of law enforcement authorities and intelligence services has 
been achieved through the creation of dedicated coordinating bodies that have provided a central 
mechanism for disseminating information and availing inter-agency operations.
154
 
The lack of trust between police and intelligence and different counter-terrorism agencies have often 
hampered an effective information sharing.   
The most important interface between the intelligence community and the police departments is the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS). Over the past decade, the Security Service has become 
more involved in judicial investigations by providing evidence at trials involving terrorist and serious 
criminal offences. 
Within police departments, the link with intelligence services (mostly the MI5) is ensured by Special 
Branches, having counter-espionage, counter-proliferation, and counter-subversive functions. They 
constitute the primary instrument to translate intelligence information into operational activities, 
investigations and prosecutions. Thus Special Branches provide national operational support to the 
Security Service.  
Moreover, in June 2003 the United Kingdom has established a fusion centre, the Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Center (JTAC), comprised of representatives from eleven government departments relating 
to international terrorism (e.g. Home Office, Police, FCO and Ministry of Defence) and meant to 
produce finished intelligence for a wide variety of audience. Such a fusion centre aims at the inclusion 
in the intelligence arena of non-traditional players.  
The blur of competences between law enforcement authorities and intelligence services in the country 
has been favoured by a fundamental shift in policing towards a strategic, future-oriented and targeted 
approach to crime control - broadly represented in the concept of “intelligence led policing” (ILP) - 
built around analysis and management of problems and risks, rather than reactive responses to 
individual crimes (a “forward looking” focus on threats to community safety).155 
Concluding remarks 
The overview of each Member State’s response to serious offences of two surveillance technologies 
identified previously (interceptions of telecommunication and video-surveillance) allows to 
understand the specificity of each regulatory framework as well as the most important similarities and 
differences between national regimes in relation to actors involved, the scope and the duration of the 
two surveillance technologies chosen as case studies in the prevention and investigation phases.  
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In general terms, one can argue that there has been an overall toughening, and a parallel higher 
curtailment of civil liberties, of the provisions concerning the use of surveillance technologies in the 
prevention and investigation of serious crime. Indeed, both terrorism and organised crime certainly 
had a catalysing effect on this development.
156
 
As underlined in this deliverable, serious crime has certainly played a catalysing effect on the 
introduction of derogatory provisions and in the expansion of powers of actors involved in either the 
authorisation or the execution process of the interception of telecommunications. Primarily introduced 
for the purpose of preventing and investigating terrorism and organised crime, the scope of these 
provisions was then extended to cover also other types of crimes of less serious nature. In addition, the 
comparative analysis validates the hypothesis that video-surveillance was, at first, introduced by the 
private sector and then by public authorities for public order prevention purposes. The data gathered 
are now used in the context of the prevention and investigation of serious crimes, including terrorism.  
Besides, serious crime has had a catalysing effect in redefining the competences of intelligence 
services and police authorities leading to an overlap of roles and tasks and potentially a blur. With 
regards to the interception of telecommunications, the blur is less visible in the United Kingdom than 
in France or Italy. In fact, in the United Kingdom, there has never been a difference between ante-
delictum/preventive interceptions (allowing for an involvement of intelligence services and not 
admissible as evidence at trial) and judicial interceptions (prerogative of the police conducted under 
judicial scrutiny). The increasing involvement of intelligence services in any kind of interception is 
thus less remarkable!  
However, the blur of competences between law enforcement and intelligence services had the positive 
consequence of stimulating an increased coordination and sharing of information between the two 
bodies and the creation of infrastructure to institutionalise this relationship, which enhances the 
effectiveness and the rapidity of the investigation. There is not yet a well-defined share of 
competences and a new balance and the three countries are still in a situation of blur and uncertainty. 
This blur is once again less noticeable in the United Kingdom where the distinction between the phase 
of prevention and investigation is less important than in the other two countries where the “charge” 
plays a more important role.   
After having examined the use of surveillance technologies for preventive and investigative purposes, 
it would be interesting to focus on the next phase of criminal procedure, i.e. the retention and use of 
information gathered via surveillance technologies for the prosecution and trial of serious crimes, 
including terrorism.
157
 A huge amount of information is nowadays retained by private companies such 
as networks and service providers, but also by different CCTV operators. The question is under which 
circumstances such information can be accessed and used by different actors of criminal procedures 
(police officers, intelligence services, prosecutors and judges) for the purposes of investigating and 
prosecuting serious crimes. The question is whether serious crime had a catalysing effect on the 
increasing use of data retained by telecommunication companies and Internet service providers by law 
enforcement officials not for preventive but for judicial investigation purposes; and whether data 
retained were originally only related to serious crime and then expanded to less serious ones.  
The retention of data for investigation and prosecution purposes raises the question of the 
collaboration between public authorities and private companies and what kind of obligations one may 
impose upon them. An additional question relates to the role of information gathered by intelligence 
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services within the criminal proceedings in the investigation, prosecution and trial of serious crimes, 
including terrorism.  
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Part 2. Comparative law paper on data retention regulation in a sample of EU Member States  
Introduction 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, law enforcement agencies have increasingly called for new 
tools to address a wide range of contemporary crimes in a manageable and cost-efficient manner.
158
 
Between 9/11 and the London bombings in 2005 the increased threat of terrorism and, to a lesser 
extent, organised crime resulted in a push for a more flexible (legal) regime to allow the use of various 
technologies enabling the interception of telecommunications. Since such interceptions reveal the 
content of personal communications, they are seen as very intrusive in the right to privacy. Instead, the 
EU’s Declaration on combating terrorism, which was adopted just after the Madrid bombings, 
encouraged the Council to examine measures that dealt with the retention of communication traffic 
data by service providers. This measure is seen by some as less intrusive than interception.
159
 Both 
traffic data and location data have been considered very useful for investigating the terrorist attacks in 
Europe.
160
 
Before looking at the details of national law, it is necessary to define the concepts under scrutiny. The 
retention of data refers to the retention of “traffic data and location data and the related data necessary 
to identify the subscriber or user”161 to the extent that those data are generated by providers of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of a public communication network within their 
jurisdiction in the process of supplying the communications services concerned.
162
 Communications 
data may be defined as the data identifying: who made a communication
163
; who received it; where the 
communication was made; what communication services were accessed by a user; and how the service 
were accessed. There exists three types of communications data: traffic data, service use data and 
subscriber information data.
164
  More specifically, the Data Retention Directive applies to the fields of 
fixed network telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, Internet email and Internet telephony.
165
 
Although EU provisions are clearly defining the purpose for which information may be retained, they 
are however vague with regard to the conditions for the retention and subsequent use of such 
information.  
Member States generally seemed to find data retention to be at least valuable, and in some cases 
indispensable
166
, for preventing and investigating serious crimes.
167
 Equally, it is often seen as an 
                                                     
 
158 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Evaluation report on the Data Retention 
Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 2011, p. 25. 
159 European Council, Declaration on Combating terrorism, 25 March 2004.  
160 Preamble 11 Directive 2006/24/EC. 
161 Art. 2 Directive 2006/24/EC. 
162 Art. 3 Directive 2006/24/EC. 
163 In the case of any pre-paid anonymous services, the identification of the subscriber is more difficult. So, the date and time 
of the initial activation of the service and the cell ID from which the service was activated should be required to have 
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164 Art. 5 Directive 2006/24/EC.  
165 Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 
2011, p. 12. 
166 The United Kingdom police agency described the availability of traffic data as ‘absolutely crucial … to investigating the 
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important tool for the prosecution as it can produce evidence to be brought to trial. Some prosecutors 
even declare that a number of guilty verdicts are almost exclusively based upon such retained data.
168
  
This deliverable analyses how data are being retained for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting 
serious crime, on the basis of the Data Retention Directive, and subsequently used. In this context, the 
authors test a “catalysing effect” hypothesis. The hypothesis relates to the so-called catalysing effect169 
of serious crime on the increasing use of data retained for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting 
serious crime by telecommunication companies and Internet service providers by law enforcement 
officials and intelligence services. It is clearly stated in the preamble that the threat of serious crimes 
including terrorism is one of the factors motivating the drafting of the Directive.
170
The catalysing 
effect of serious crime on the use of data retention is amplified by the fact that the Directive leaves a 
wide discretion to Member States and that the implementing legislation broadens the scope of 
application of data retention both regarding offences and authorities involved. 
In implementing the Data Retention Directive, Member States have often widened the scope of 
application of certain provisions. Firstly, according to the Directive, access to retained data should be 
limited to the purposes of investigating, detecting and prosecuting serious crimes only.
171
 However, no 
definition of what constitutes ‘serious crimes’172 was introduced, and as a result the access and use of 
retained data has been extended to less serious offences in some Member States (e.g. Belgium, Italy, 
United Kingdom). Secondly, the Data Retention Directive allowed Member States to define which 
‘competent national authorities’ may access the retained traffic data, and under which specific 
conditions.
173
 National legislation often gave intelligence services access to retained data, thereby 
allowing the use of data retention also for preventive purposes.
174
  
As a consequence, the Data Retention Directive contributes to the blur of competences between law 
enforcement authorities and intelligence services in the prevention and investigation of serious 
crimes
175
 as well as to a general shift towards prevention, proactive investigations and intelligence-led 
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167 Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 2477th Council meeting, PRES/02/404, 19 December 2002. It 
underlines that data are a “valuable tool” in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, in 
particular organised crime. See also the UK, Malcolm Rifkind, MP (Chairman), Access to communications data by the 
intelligence and security agencies, Intelligence and Security Committee, February 2013, p. 8. 
168 See e.g. interview with B. Michel, Federal Prosecutor (Brussels, 26 February 2013). 
169 See C. Cocq and F. Galli, “The use of surveillance technologies for the prevention and investigation of serious crimes”, 
SURVEILLE Deliverable, D4.1 (October 2012). 
170 See preamble 8 of Directive 2006/24/EC. 
171 Art. 1 Directive 2006/24/EC. 
172 See art. 83 TEU: serious crime concerns the offences “with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact 
of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis” including terrorism, trafficking in human 
beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, 
corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime. However, the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) defines the concept as follows: “Serious crime” shall mean conduct 
constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty. 
173 Art. 4 Directive 2006/24/EC. 
174 There is no European instrument on the use of surveillance technologies, including data retention, by intelligence services. 
See also e.g. M. Rifkind, MP (Chairman), Access to communications data by the intelligence and security agencies, 
Intelligence and Security Committee, February 2013, p. 10; in fact, the report considers that “communications data is 
integral to the work of the intelligence and security Agencies and, certainly in terms of the Security Service, it is used in 
all their investigations”. 
175 Intelligence agencies would generally provide background information and “advance warnings about people who are 
thought to be a risk to commit acts of terrorism or other threats to national security”, but would – unlike law enforcement 
agencies – not be actively engaged in investigating acts of terrorism. K. Roach, “Secret evidence and its alternatives” in 
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policing within the criminal justice system.
176
This hypothesis is tested within nine EU Member States, 
namely Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and the United 
Kingdom. 
For the purpose of the comparative research, national reports were drafted on the basis of a grid of 
analysis. Semi-structured interviews have been carried out, where appropriate, to complete the black-
letter law study and test the main hypothesis with practitioners. These countries have been chosen 
because of their importance in the fight against terrorism
177
 and because they have experienced 
different histories, including the existence of authoritarian regimes, which may have influenced the 
development of the domestic criminal justice system.
178
 The comparative analysis of the case studies 
will allow us to highlight potential differences in provisions regulating the retention and subsequent 
use of information between European Member States with an authoritarian past and Member States 
without such a past. As such, it can shed light on an initial hypothesis of SURVEILLE, which was that 
countries that have experienced at various historical phases an authoritarian past (Italy, Germany, 
Spain, Romania and Poland) may, as a result, have developed more robust fundamental rights 
safeguards in their data retention procedures. If such a conclusion can be drawn, it will need also to be 
assessed whether it relates only or mainly to ‘new’ Member States with an authoritarian past, or also to 
countries that at an earlier phase had experienced totalitarianism.
179
 
The topic is particularly sensitive as data retention may clash with the constitutional traditions 
(particularly the respect of the right to privacy) of different Member States. This has led to difficulties 
in the implementation of the Data Retention directive.  
National legislative changes since 2011 
For the time being, the Data Retention Directive has been fully implemented in all other jurisdictions 
chosen as case studies for this deliverable (ES, FR, NL, RO, PL, IT, UK). In some of those Member 
States, provisions on data retention already existed before the implementation of the Data Retention 
Directive (e.g. UK).  
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A. Masferrer (ed.), Post 9/11 and the state of permanent legal emergency. Security and human rights in countering 
terrorism, Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on law and justice 14, Springer, 2012, p. 180. 
176 Proactive investigation has been defined as “the prevention of serious crimes that threaten the safety of many citizens, in 
particular terrorism, and for which reason the traditional criminal investigative functions (evidence gathering) and 
intelligence investigative functions (the gathering of information about threats to national security for the purpose of 
prevention) have been merged.” M. F.H. Hirsch Ballin, Anticipative criminal investigation. Theory and counter-terrorism 
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177 Some of them have experienced terrorism before 9/11 and have a long tradition of countering it; their national legislation 
has been a point of reference for the EU. More generally, the chosen Member States have significant experience in the 
fight against organised crime. Another reason for this selection is also to have a sample of States that is representative of: 
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bodies (administrative police and police judiciaire). 
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Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and the United Kingdom. In the course of the research Ireland was 
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comprehensive comparative coverage and the availability of complete sources. 
179 See K. Hadjimatheou, “Paper on the ethics of data retention distinguishing between democratic and authoritarian 
regimes”, SURVEILLE Deliverable, D4.4 (forthcoming). 
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In 2011, the European Commission issued an evaluation of the implementation of the Data Retention 
Directive.
180
 That report highlighted that the Directive was not implemented or was only partially 
implemented in three of the countries under scrutiny: Belgium, Germany and Romania. Since the 
Commission’s evaluation came out, Romania implemented the Directive by Law 82/2012 on 18 June 
2012. The Constitutional Court of Romania had ruled in 2009 that the previous law
181
 that had 
implemented the Directive, violated the fundamental right to private life as provided by article 26 of 
the Romanian Constitution. Therefore, this law had been declared unconstitutional in its entirety.
182
 
However, the European Commission urged Romania to fully implement the Data Retention Directive 
within two months
183
 and national authorities eventually implemented it.   
Two Member States have not yet fully transposed the 2006 Directive: Belgium and Germany.  
The German Constitutional Court concluded in May 2010 that the Data Retention Directive violated 
the Constitution.
184
 German authorities have suggested that a “quick freeze” method of data 
preservation could be an alternative to the mass retention of data. First, on 19 January 2011, the 
German Ministry of Justice published a report on data retention, in which it encouraged 
telecommunications providers to ‘freeze’ the traffic data of the users suspected of offences, as they 
could be necessary for the investigation of crimes as well as for detecting alleged criminals. 
Interestingly, the report found no indication that retained traffic data would have prevented serious 
crimes such as terrorist attacks. It further found that the absence of a data retention regulation did not 
lead to less crimes being solved since 2010 – to the contrary.185 Then, on 10 June 2011 Justice 
Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger released a discussion paper about the data retention 
debate in Germany, suggesting a "quick freeze" method in order to replace mass data retention.
186
 
Under such a procedure, law enforcement authorities and intelligence agencies may require the 
‘freezing’ of specific data relating to a suspect after having obtained a specific order.  
After the evaluation report of the Commission came out in 2011,
 187
 a new debate took place. Despite 
the fact that 50.000 citizens signed a petition against the Directive, the Commission required Germany 
to implement it, threatening to launch an infringement procedure before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. On 27 January 2012, the Federal Ministry of Justice addressed
188
 a report on the 
effects of the Constitutional Court’s decision in 2010 and asserted the need for retention of 
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186 Quick Freeze/Datensicherung, Bundesministerium der Justiz, http://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/2011/20110125 
_rechtspolitischer_Neujahrsempfang.html?nn=1463642 (accessed on 22 April 2013).  
187 Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive, COM(2011) 225 final, 18 June 2011. 
188 On the basis of a study carried out by Max Planck Institute. 
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communication traffic data for law enforcement and security purposes. Later in March, the Ministry of 
Justice announced the launch of a cabinet study in order to analyse further the “quick freeze” option of 
retaining traffic data. After having reiterated its implementation request, the Commission officially 
opened an infringement procedure against Germany in May 2012.
189
 However, since then, there have 
been no further legal developments on the matter.  
Belgium has also only partially implemented the Directive, and as a result it has been subject to legal 
action by the Commission. In particular, Belgium has not implemented the provision concerning the 
duration of the retention. In fact, there has been intense discussion in Belgium about the time a service 
provider would need to retain data. NGOs, communications services and Internet providers were not 
only against the Directive because of its implications for the right to privacy, but they also argued that 
the period of retention should not be enshrined in secondary legislation (an Arrêté Royal), but in a law. 
That is the reason why the adoption of the Arrêté Royal, which should have specified how long data 
would be retained, in application of Law 2010 MRD/BIM (méthodes de recueil des données par les 
services de renseignement et de sécurité) has been delayed. However, very recently, the Council of 
Ministers agreed on a draft legislation and a draft royal decree aiming to fully implement the Data 
Retention Directive.
 190
 These drafts should be discussed in Parliament soon in order to comply with 
all requirements of the Directive. 
Data retention vs. data preservation  
The data retention, as provided for by the Data Retention Directive, requires operators to retain data, 
excluding the content, generated or processed as a result of activities of all users of operators' 
communications or network services so that they can be accessed by State authorities and used for 
public order purposes when necessary and lawful.
191
 
An alternative method is known as expedited preservation of retained data or “quick freeze”. Data 
preservation only requires preserving specific data either in relation to a specific person or in relation 
to specific offence. It refers to situations where a person or an organisation (which may be a 
communications service provider or any physical or legal person who has the possession or control of 
data) is required by a State authority to preserve certain data only from loss or modification for a 
specific period of time.
192
 Data preservation therefore requires that data already existing in a stored 
form be protected from external factors that would cause them to be deleted or their quality or 
condition to change or deteriorate. Preserved data or copies of those data may be accessed and used for 
legitimate purposes by authorised persons defined by national legislation.  This method is considered 
as less intrusive into the right to privacy than data retention. Data retention involves an 
undifferentiated storage of data while the storage by the data preservation is more specific and only 
concerns certain data. In Germany, data preservation has been preferred over data retention for this 
reason. However, the Commission has made clear that data preservation as is currently being 
discussed in Germany would not amount to a full transposition of the Directive.
193
  
                                                     
 
189 Data retention: Commission takes Germany to Court requesting that fines be imposed, 31 May 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-530_en.htm (accessed on 22 April 2013).  
190 Council of Ministers, Transposition de la directive européenne “conservation des données”, Brussels (BE), 29 March 
2013: http://www.presscenter.org/fr/pressrelease/20130329/transposition-de-la-directive-europeenne-conservation-des-
donnees (accessed on 20 April 2013). 
191 Art.1 Directive 2006/24/EC. 
192 Art. 16 Cybercrime Convention, for a maximum of 90 days. 
193 European Commission, “Data retention: Commission takes Germany to requesting that fines be imposed”, Press Release, 
IP/12/530, 31 May 2012. 
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The Cybercrime Convention of the Council of Europe requires only data preservation.
194
 Therefore, 
Member States that have also ratified the Convention have the obligation to implement both measures.  
At the national level, data preservation provisions apply to any criminal offence in five countries 
(BE
195
, DE
196
, FR
197
, IT
198
, PL
199
, RO
200
), while one country limits slightly its scope (NL
201
). 
Moreover, some are preserving data via a general obligation to protect and secure data from accidental 
or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, or unauthorised or unlawful storage, processing, 
access or disclosure” (ES202, UK203). Germany also provides for a general obligation to protect data 
against unauthorised access and thus potential alteration.
204
 Even if the scope differs from a State to 
another, it is noteworthy that all States have created legal provisions to implement the EU and Council 
of Europe requirements even if the methods used are not the same. 
Conditions of data retention and access in the different States 
The Data Retention Directive requires Member States to ensure that operators respect four principles. 
“The retained data shall be: 
 of the same quality and subject to the same security and protection as those data on the [public 
communications] network ; 
 subject to appropriate technical and organisation measures to protect the data against accidental 
or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, or unauthorised or unlawful storage, 
processing, access or disclosure ;  
 subject to appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that they can be accessed 
by especially authorised personnel only ; and 
 destroyed at the end of the period of retention, except those that have been accessed and 
preserved [for the purpose set down in the Directive].” 205 
                                                     
 
194 Art. 16-17 Convention on Cybercrime. 
195 Art. 16 Law (portant assentiment à la Convention sur la Cybercriminalité), 3 August 2012. Terminology used: 
“conservation rapide des données informatiques stockées”. Data kept for the time necessary and for no long than 90 days. 
196 Art. 96 Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG). Data are preserved for commercial purposes because there is no transposition 
for judicial purposes.  
197 Art. 34 Law 17/1978. Office central de lutte contre la criminalité liée aux technologies de l’information et de la 
communication (OCLCTIC), judicial police, Ministry of Interior are responsible for the preservation.   
198 Art. 247 (1bis) CCP. 
199 Art. 218a and b CCP. Method of preservation is provided into Regulation of the Minister of Justice, 28 April 2004. 
200 Art. 154 CCP and art. 54(1) Law 161/2003, chapter IV Procedural provisions. Before Directive 2006. In urgent and dully 
justified cases, if there are substantiated indications regarding the preparation of or the performance of a criminal offence 
by means of computer systems, for the purpose of gathering evidence or identifying the doers, the expeditious 
preservation of the computer data or the data referring to data traffic, subject to the danger of destruction or alteration, 
can be disposed. 
201 Art. 126ni and 126ui CCP for serious crimes and especially art. 126zja CPP for terrorist purposes. See also art. 67 CPP: in 
case of suspicion of an offence punishable to imprisonment of four years or more. 
202 Art. 8 Law 25/2007. There is no specific procedure in Spanish Law to preserve data. Moreover, it is noteworthy that data 
retention and data preservation are translated into the same term “conservación de datos”. 
203 Art. 6 Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009. 
204 §109 TKG. 
205 Art. 5 Directive 2006/24/EC amending Directive 2002/58/EC; Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive, 
COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 2011, p. 15. 
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Operators are prohibited from processing data retained under the Data Retention Directive for other 
purposes, provided that the data would not otherwise have been retained.  
Belgium has implemented three of these principles but does not explicitly provide for the destruction 
of data at the end of the period of retention.
206
 Italy provides for the destruction of data.
207
 France
208
 
and the United Kingdom
209
 have transposed all the four principles.   
Legal basis and purpose of data retention 
The Data Retention Directive imposed on Member States an obligation for providers of publicly 
available electronic communications services and public communication networks to retain 
communications data for the purpose of the investigation, detection
210
 and prosecution of serious 
crime, as defined by each Member State in national law, and sought to harmonise EU regulation on 
data retention. It amended article 15(1) of the e-Privacy Directive
211
 so that the principle of 
confidentiality it enshrined does not apply to data retention.  
Five Member States (DE
212
, ES
213
, NL
214
, RO
215
, UK
216) have defined “serious crime”, with reference 
to a minimum prison sentence, to the possibility of a custodial sentence being imposed, or to a list of 
criminal offences defined elsewhere in national legislation. Nevertheless, these definitions are often 
different from one Member State to another. By contrast, four Member States (BE
217
, FR
218
, IT
219
, 
PL
220
) require data to be retained not only for investigation, detection and prosecution in relation to 
serious crime, but also in relation to all criminal offences and even for crime prevention purposes, or 
on general grounds of national or state and/or public security.  
                                                     
 
206 Art. 6 Arrêté Royal of 9 January 2003. 
207 Art. 123 and 126 Data protection Code. 
208 Art. D. 98-5 Code des Postes et des Communications Electroniques (CPCE); art. L-34-1 (V) CPCE; art. 34 Act 17/1978; 
art. 34-1 CPCE; art. 11, Law 17/1978. 
209 Art. 6 Data Retention Regulation.  
210 Detection could be defined as the fact of the police discovering information about crimes. 
211 Art. 15(1) Directive 2002/58/EC, “Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the rights and 
obligations provided for in Article 5, Article 6, Article 8(1), (2), (3) and (4), and Article 9 of this Directive when such 
restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard 
national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication system, as referred to in Article 
13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC. To this end, Member States may, inter alia, adopt legislative measures providing for the 
retention of data for a limited period justified on the grounds laid down in this paragraph. All the measures referred to in 
this paragraph shall be in accordance with the general principles of Community law, including those referred to in Article 
6(1) and (2) of the Treaty on European Union.” 
212 Art. 100a stop (German Code of criminal procedure). 
213 Art. 1(1) Law 25/2007. 
214 Art. 126 CCP. 
215 Art. 2(e) Law 82/2012. 
216 S. 93(4) Police Act 1997.  
217 Art. 126(1) Law of 13 June 2005 concerning electronic communications. 
218 Art. L.34-1(II), CPCE, Law 64/2006 and Law 669/2009. 
219 Art. 132(1) Data Protection Code. 
220 Art. 180a, Telecommunications Law of 16 July 2004 as amended by art. 1 Act of 24 April 2009.  
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New stakeholders 
The Data Retention Directive applies to ‘the providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks’ (art. 1(1)). Interestingly, because of 
the cost imposed, providers are searching a new way to reduce the cost imposed to medium and small 
operators, for example, in organising hosted third-party storage service.221 The United Kingdom does 
not require small operators to retain data222 because the costs both to the provider and to the State of 
doing so would outweigh the benefits to the criminal justice system and law enforcement authorities. 
Other Member States (e.g. NL, PL, ES223) do not specifically differentiate between large and small 
operators in their legislation. Indeed, while large operators benefit from economies of scale in terms of 
costs, smaller operators in some Member States tend to set up joint ventures or to outsource to 
companies that specialise in retention and retrieval functions in order to reduce retention costs. Such 
outsourcing of technical functions does not affect the obligation of providers to appropriately 
supervise processing operations and to ensure that the required security measures are in place, which 
can be problematic particularly for smaller operators.
224
 However, the European Commission 
considered that even if telecommunication providers have had to bear considerable costs, the health of 
the telecom sector does not seem to be affected by the Directive to any significant degree. Operators’ 
different perceptions may result from differences in implementation. Clearer rules are required, 
including on State compensation for the cost of data retention.
225
 
Duration of retention 
Article 6 of the Directive requires the Member States to retain data for periods of not less than six 
months and not more than two years from the date of the communication. This provision gives 
important latitude to Member States to decide the duration of retention. However, States do not exceed 
the period provided for by the Directive. The nationally defined period to retain data differs not only 
from one Member State to the other but it also depends sometimes on the type of communication. In 
fact, two Member States differentiate between telephone data and Internet data (IT, NL).  
 
States Duration 
Belgium Between 1 year and 36 months for 'publically available' telephone services.  
No provision for internet-related data.
226
  
                                                     
 
221 See e.g. in Sweden, the Stadsnatsforeningen och Stadsnat is negotiating a hosted third-party storage service for 150 
network operators. 
222 Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive COM(2011) 225 final, p. 9. It is justified by the burden of the cost 
imposed to them. 
223 However, according to art. 10(4) and (5) of the Spanish Telecommunications Law (linked to Law 25/2007), those 
operators with no impact in the market might receive a special treatment regarding some general obligations, or even a 
complete exclusion from such obligations, at the discretion of the Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones. 
Recently, the Royal Decree 1619/2012 aims to reduce the cost of small and medium companies with a specific and 
regulated billing system. 
224 See also “La protection des données personnelles: les petites et moyennes entreprises mettent en garde”, EU-logos, 21 
February 2013, http://eulogos.blogactiv.eu/2013/02/21/protection-des-donnees-personnelles-les-petites-et-moyennes-
entreprises-mettent-en-garde/ (accessed on 15 April 2013).  
225 Cecilia Malmström, “Taking on the Data Retention Directive”, SPEECH/10/723, European Commission conference, 
Brussels, 3 December 2010.  
226 Art. 126(2) Law of 13 June 2005 concerning electronic communications. Because no duration has been implemented in a 
specific manner. The Arrêté Royal planned to specify the duration has finally not been decided. This is the reason why 
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France The period of data retention is of one year.
227
 Operators and providers take, 
without delay, all the measures in order to retain, for a duration not exceeding 
one year, the content of the information accessed by the user. The information 
must be given to the competent national authorities without delay
228
. 
Germany  Telecommunications companies store traffic data for commercial purposes up 
to six months
229
 
Italy The period of data retention depends on the different categories of data.
230
 
Land-line and mobile communication data are retained for 2 years. Internet 
access, internet email and internet data are retained for one year.  
Netherland Traffic data and subscribers’ data in relation to telephone services for 12 
months
231, and traffic data and subscribers’ data in relation to Internet access 
services must be retained for 6 months
232
.  
Poland One year
233
 
Romania Six months
234
 
Spain One year
235
 
United Kingdom  One year as of the date of the communication
236
 
Access to data: authorities and procedure 
Most Member States under analysis, both national police forces and prosecutors may access retained 
data.
237
 
 
States 
Competent authorities to 
access 
Procedure 
Belgium Prosecutor, judge (juge 
d’instruction); police238; 
intelligence services
239
 
Access must be authorised either by a judge or 
prosecutor. Upon request, operators must provide, 
without delay, subscriber data and traffic and 
(Contd.)                                                                  
 
the Commission sent a formal notice to Belgium, infringement n° 2012/2152. In practice, operators and providers 
retained data for one year. Prosecutor B. Michel, interview, 26 February 2013. 
227 Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive, COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 2011, p. 13. 
228 Art. 60-2 CCP.  
229 §97 TKG. 
230 Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 
2011, p. 14. 
231 Art. 13.2a(3)(a) Telecommunications Act. 
232 Art. 13.2(3)(b) Telecommunications Act. 
233 "Report on the retention of telecommunications data", Raport dotyczący retencji danych telekomunikacyjnych 
opracowany przez sekretarza stanu ds. bezpieczeństwa w Kancelarii Premiera Jacka Cichockiego, 8 june 2011. It 
recommended the shortening of the retention period for telecommunication data to one year, which was implemented at 
the end of January 2013. 
234 Art. 3(2) Law 82/2012. 
235 Law 25/2007. 
236 §5 Data Retention Regulations 2009. 
237 Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive, COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 2011, p. 9. 
238 Law of 21 March 2007 (réglant l’installation et l’utilisation de caméras de surveillance).  
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location data for calls made within the last month.  
Data for older calls must be provided as soon as 
possible.  
The Prosecutor cannot have access to all data 
relating to telecommunications in the same ways as 
the juge d’instruction (this is in cases where the 
warrant is initiated by him instead of the JI). 
France Prosecutor
240
, police under the 
prosecutor’s warrant after prior 
authorisation of the judge 
(JLD)
241
; Minister of the 
Interior 
Police must provide justification for each request for 
access to retained data and must seek authorisation 
from a person in the Ministry of the Interior 
designated by the Commission nationale de contrôle 
des interceptions de sécurité. Requests for access are 
handled by a designated officer working for the 
operator. 
In cases where access is requested by the Minister of 
Interior, an independent authority the Commission 
nationale du contrôle des interception de sécurité 
controls the actions carried out by the administrative 
police. 
Germany  Judges
242
 can have access to 
traffic data; Prosecutor
243
 in 
case of emergency; in specific 
cases, the Federal Network 
Agency 
(Bundesnetzagentur
244
) (FNA) 
The judicial authority gives an authorisation to have 
access to data. 
However, according to some specific agreements 
between the FNA and the operators, the FNA may 
have access to data without the knowledge of 
operators
245
. 
Italy Prosecutor, judge
246
, Police, 
defence counsel for the 
defendant or the person under 
investigation
247
; intelligence 
services
248
 
Access requires a “reasoned warrant” issued by the 
public prosecutor. Thus, Prosecutor, law 
enforcement, defence counsel for the defendant or 
the person under investigation have access to data.
249
 
Netherlands Prosecutor
250
 Access must be given by a warrant of the prosecutor 
or the investigative judge  
(Contd.)                                                                  
 
239 Law 4 February 2010 (Méthodes de Recueil des Données). 
240 Art. 60-1 CPP as modified by the Law 2004/204 of 9 March 2004 and the Law 2007/297 of 5 March 2007. 
241 Art. 6 Law 2004/575. 
242 § 100g StPO. 
243 “Rechtsvergleichende Analyse im Hinblick auf die Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2006/24/EG über die 
Vorratsdatenspeicherung im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie”, im Auftrag des 
Bundesministeriums für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie, 10.3.2008, p.32, fn.14. 
244 Federal Authority within the scope of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
245 § 112(1) TKG. 
246 In Italy, the duration of retention is divided into two periods. In the first period, the Prosecutor may require directly the 
access, but for the second period the authorisation has to be given by the judge. 
247 Art. 132(3) Data Protection Code ; art. 15 Italian Constitution. 
248 Art. 26 §1 Law 124/2007 only for security purposes. 
249 Art. 132(3) Data Protection Code. 
250 Art. 126ni CCP. 
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Poland Police, Border control officers, 
Treasury Intelligence, Military 
Gendarmerie, Customs 
Service, Internal Security 
Agency, Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau, Military 
Counter-Intelligence 
Services
251
 
Access to data is subject to a written request
252
 or an 
oral request.
253
 
s. 37 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
requires that local councils obtain judicial approval 
from a judge before accessing communications data. 
Romania Prosecutor, courts, and State 
authorities with 
responsibilities in national 
security
254
, the police (under 
the supervision of the 
Prosecutor for data 
retention)
255
 
Requests of the prosecution, the courts and State 
authorities in charge of national security will be 
made on the basis of legal provisions
256
 and will be 
transmitted electronically signed with advanced 
electronic signature based on a qualified certificate 
issued by an accredited certification service provider.  
Data are transmitted electronically in Romania
257
 in 
order to avoid any modification of these data. 
Spain Court warrant
258
; director of 
State Security
259
  
Once the judge has issued his/her decision, the 
prosecutor will be informed
260
; the director of State 
Security communicates it to the competent judge 
immediately.
261
 
United 
Kingdom  
Serious Organised Crime 
Agency, the Scottish Crime 
and Drug Enforcement 
Agency, Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs, any of 
the intelligence services and 
Access permitted, subject to authorisation by a 
‘designated person’ and necessity and 
proportionality test, in specific cases and in 
circumstances in which disclosure of the data is 
permitted or required by law. Specific procedures 
have been agreed with operators.  
                                                     
 
251 Art. 20c(1) State Police Act, 6 April 1990; art. lOb(1) Border Guard Act, 12 October 1990; art. 36b(1) pt 1 Fiscal Control 
Act, 28 September 1991; art. 30(1) Military Police and Military Law Enforcement Authorities Act, 24 August 2001; art. 
28(1) pt 1 Internal Security Agency and Intelligence Agency Act, 24 May 2002; art. 18(1) pt1 Central Anti-Corruption 
Bureau Act; art. 32(1) pt 1 Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service Act, 9 June 2006; art. 
179(3), Telecommunications Law 16 July 2004 as amended by art. 1, 24 April 2009.  
252 The Chief Commander of the Police or the Regional Commander of the Police, or a person they authorised/General Fiscal 
Control Inspector/ Head of the Customs Service or the Director of the Customs Chamber, or a person they 
authorised/Chief Commander of the Border Guard or a commander of the Border Guard's division, or a person they 
authorised/Chief Commander of the Military Police or a commander of the Military Police' division, or a person they 
authorised/ the Head of Internal Security Agency, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Military Counter-intelligence Service 
or a person authorised by that authority. 
253 An officer of authorised agency holding a written authorisation issued by an appropriate senior official in the organisation. 
254 Art. 16 Law 82/2012. 
255 Art. 18 Law 82/2012. 
256 Art. 3, 15(1) and 16 Law 82/2012. 
257 Art. 16 Law 82/2012. 
258 Spanish law 25/2007; See STS 1330/2002, 16 July; STC 123/2002. 
259 Art. 579(4) CCP: i) emergency cases and, ii) investigations of organised crimes, terrorism or rebels. 
260 Art. 306 LECr (CCP). 
261 The judge has then seventy-two hours to revoke or confirm the authorisation. Likewise, communications’ interventions of 
prisoners can be authorised by the Director of the prison, who will later inform the competent judge, called Juez de 
Vigilancia Penitenciaria. See SSTC 106/2001, de 23 April y 128/1997, 14 July. 
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some other public 
authorities
262
; intelligence 
services 
263
 
 
The access to data retained by operators or providers located outside the EU area follow specific 
procedures. A request for mutual legal assistance or a judicial decision is the only way to obtain these 
data.
264
 
Scope of data retention and access 
The retention applies to the source of communications
265
, the destination of communications, the data, 
time and duration of communications,
266
 type of communications, user’s267 communication equipment 
or what purports to be their equipment, and, finally, the location of mobile communication 
equipment
268
. The different Member States include these elements in their implementing legislation. 
However, the grounds on which the access to data is allowed are different. Some States, only permit 
access for the purpose of pending proceedings (PL
269
, ES
270
), while other governments allow access 
for the much broader purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder, or in the 
interests of public safety (serious crimes and security purposes) (BE
271
, DE
272
, UK
273
). In any case, 
each request to access data or images must be justified.  
                                                     
 
262 S. 25 RIPA 2000. 
263 S. 7 Data retention Regulation and 22 RIPA. 
264 See Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters between the Member States of the European Union, O.J.C. 197, 
12 July 2000, 29 May 2000 ; Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange of information 
and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member Statesof the European Union, 18 December 2006 ; 
see also Council of Europe, Rapport sur l’incidence des principes de la protection des données sur les données judiciaires 
en matière pénale y compris dans le cadre de la coopération judiciaire en matière pénale, 2002. At the national level, 
Draft Communications Data Bill Joint Committee (UK), Juridictional issues, Requests addressed to overseas CSPs, 11 
December 2012, §231; art. 694 to art. 695-9-49 french CCP.   
265 Art. 2 Directive 2002/58/EC. See ‘communication’ means any information exchanged or conveyed between a finite 
number of parties by means of a publicly available electronic communications service. This does not include any 
information conveyed as part of a broadcasting service to the public over an electronic communications network except 
to the extent that the information can be related to the identifiable subscriber or user receiving the information. 
266  ‘Traffic data’ means any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a communication on an electronic 
communications network or for the billing thereof. 
267 ‘User’ means any natural person using a publicly available electronic communications service, for private or business 
purposes, without necessarily having subscribed to this service. 
268 ‘Location data’ means any data processed in an electronic communications network, indicating the geographic position of 
the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available electronic communications service. 
269 Art. 18(6) Act on providing services by electronic means. The report on the retention of telecommunications data already 
mentioned (n.77) recommends a limitation of the scope for the possibility of using such data only to prosecution of 
serious offences and special cases specified by law. Such provisions should apply only to offences subject to the 
imprisonment of minimum 3 years. The limitation recommended in the proposal, as applied, observed Panoptykon 
Foundation, does not solve the problem.  In practice it allows to obtain telecommunication data in cases of offences that 
are not of a 'serious nature', such as the one defined in art. 290 PC - appropriating fallen trees in a forest. 
270 Spanish law 25/2007 permits access to law enforcement authorities as long as it is for the investigation of a serious crime. 
271 Art. 19/1 Law 2010 MRD. 
272 Art. 100a and g StPO, art. 113 TKG. 
273 S. 7 Data retention Regulation and s. 22(2) of RIPA. 
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Role of retained data as evidence in the criminal justice system 
In some cases, data that needs to be retained under the Data Retention Directive has enabled the 
construction of trails of evidence leading up to an offence.
274
 Retained data are used to detect, or to 
corroborate other forms of evidence on the activities and links between suspects. Location data has 
been used, both by law enforcement and defendants, to exclude suspects from crime scenes and to 
verify alibis. This evidence can therefore remove persons from criminal investigations, thereby 
eliminating the need for more intrusive inquiries, or leading to acquittals at trial.
275
  
Data that needs to be retained under the Data Retention Directive has been essential in the 
investigation of a number of serious crimes.
276
 In Belgium, for example, one may refer to the 2008 
conviction of the perpetrators of a so-called tiger kidnapping
277
 of an employee of Antwerp criminal 
court, in which location data linking their activities in three separate towns was decisive in convincing 
the jury of their complicity. In a case of a motorcycle-gang related murder in 2007, location data from 
the offenders' mobile phones proved that they were in the area when the murder took place and led to a 
partial confession.
278
 In Belgium and in the United Kingdom, certain crimes involving communication 
over internet can only be investigated via data retention: for instance, threats of violence expressed in 
chat rooms often leave no trace other than the traffic data in cyberspace. A similar situation applies in 
the case of crimes carried out over the telephone. For example, in Poland, a case of fraud against 
elderly persons in late 2009/early 2010 has been carried out by means of telephone calls, where 
perpetrators pretended to be family members in need of loans; they could only be identified through 
retained telephony data.
279
  
Secondly, there have been cases for which, in the absence of forensic or eyewitness evidence, the only 
way to start a criminal investigation has been to access and analyse retained data. In Germany, there 
was the example of the murder of a police officer, where the assailant had escaped in the victim's 
vehicle, which he then abandoned. It was possible to establish that he had then telephoned for an 
alternative means of transport. There was no forensic or eyewitness evidence as to the identity of the 
murderer, and the authorities were dependent on the availability of this traffic data to enable them to 
pursue the investigation. In cases of internet-related child sexual abuse, data retention has been 
indispensable to successful investigation.
280
 On the EU level, the effectiveness of Operation Rescue 
                                                     
 
274 C. Goemans and J. Dumortier, “Mandatory retention of traffic data in the EU : possible impact on privacy and on-line 
anonymity”, Digital Anonymity and the Law, series IT & Law/2, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003, p 161-183 ; interviews with 
different actors of the criminal justice system in Belgium, France, the United Kingdom. 
275 Ibid. ; This was claimed in DE, PL and the UK, according to the Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive, 
COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 2011, p. 23. 
276 Council of the European Union, Answers to questionnaire on traffic data retention, 11490/1/02 CRIMORG 67 TELECOM 
4 REV 1, Brussels, 20 November 2002. Q7: How would you rate the solution of creating an instrument on traffic data 
retention for law enforcement purposes at a European level? For instance, Belgium declared that “data retention being a 
useful tool for investigating cybercrime, as well as serious crime involving the use of a computer, the general principles 
of data retention should be determined in an EU instrument”; Greece considers the creation of such a legal tool to be 
important, useful and essential; the United Kingdom, “to resolve these issues on a European basis would be very useful”. 
Cecilia Malmström, “Taking on the Data Retention Directive”, SPEECH/10/723, 3 December 2010.  
277 The kidnapping of a person in order to compel him/her or a third person to commit another crime. 
278 National Policing Improvement Agency, United-Kingdom, The journal of Homicide and Major Incident Investigation, 
vol.5, issue 1, Spring 2009, pp. 39-51.  
279 Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive, COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 2011, p. 24. See also 
European Parliament, Parliamentary questions, Juozas Imbrasas (EFD), the application of preventative measures to 
combat telephone fraud, 19 June 2012  
280 See e.g. the debate in Data retention as a tool for investigating internet child pornography and other internet crimes, 
Hearing before the subcommittee on crime, terrorism and homeland security of the Committee on the judiciary house of 
representatives, serial 112-3, 25 January 2011.  
Francesca Galli and Céline C. Cocq 
43 
(facilitated by Europol) in protecting children against abuse has been hampered because the non-
transposition of the Data Retention Directive has prevented certain Member States from investigating 
members of an extensive international paedophile network by using IP addresses.
281
 
Rules of evidence 
Data retention is not only useful for investigation purposes but also as evidence at trial. Rules of 
evidence are hence worth exploring. Of interest in relation to the main hypothesis of this paper is also 
whether and upon which conditions any information gathered by intelligence agencies may be used as 
evidence.  
Comparative approach between the selected Member States 
In most countries, the rules of evidence can be summarised according to three principles:  
1. The legality of the collection of evidence. 
Evidence may only be admitted if legally obtained (BE282, ES283, FR, PL284).  This principle may 
considerably hamper the effect of irregular evidence, i.e. evidence collected in violation of procedural 
or substantial evidence gathering rules.285 Yet, in some countries, such evidence may be admitted if 
its irregular nature does not harm the interests of the party (BE286, FR, NL).287 Similarly, where 
evidence can be cross-examined at trial, irregular evidence may not be excluded if it does not 
constitute the sole basis of the proceedings (i.e. if corroborating evidence exists).288 
2. The freedom in the types of evidence employed289 (BE290, DE291, ES, FR, NL, PL, RO292, UK)  
However, some countries limit the types of evidence, which could be presented at trial by specific 
rules (DE
293
, RO). 
                                                     
 
281 Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive, COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 2011, p. 24. 
282 e.g. art. 18/3 and art. 18/9 Law 4 February 2010. 
283 Art. 11(1) LOPJ; art. 15 Spanish Constitution. 
284 Art. 170 CCP.  
285 French procedural law distinguishes textual nullities, i.e. nullities explicitly provided for in the CCP. See for instance, art. 
59(2) CCP concerning formalities prescribed for search and seizure; art 80-1 CCP concerning the late placement under 
judicial examination; art. 100-7 CCP concerning the interception of telecommunication of a defence lawyer, substantial 
nullities, i.e. nullities decided in a case-by-case basis, codified by art. 171 CCP, which states that ‘There is a nullity when 
the breach of an essential formality provided for by a provision of the present Code or by any other rule of criminal 
procedure has harmed the interests of the party it concerns’ and public order nullities, which concerns irregularities 
affecting an important public interest. 
286 Cass. 14 October 2003, Antigone case; see also, M. Delmas-Marty and J.R. Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures 
(CUP, Cambridge, 2006), p. 122. 
287 However, case law often considers that textual nullities are subject to the same requirement. See, ECtHR, Schenk v. 
Switzerland, 12 July 1988, 13 EHRR 242. The Court admitted that illegal evidence can be produced and used in court, as 
soon as it had been discussed in the context of a fair trial. 
288 e.g. in BE, Cass. 18 January 1971, Pas. 1971 I. 459; Cass. 10 June 1974, 1974 I. 1040; in the UK, Chp. 2, Part 11, 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 ; in ES, art. 297 LECr. 
289 Evidence may be supplied in any appropriate form except where the law provides otherwise. 
290 Cass., 27 February 2002, Pas., 2002, p. 598; Cass. 5 March 2002, Pas., 2002. 
291 Art. 261 CCP. 
292 Art. 741 CCP. 
293 Art. 244 (II) StPO. 
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3. And, its corollary, the discretion of the judge to assess it.294  
Some States give more liberty to the Prosecutor in the gathering of evidence because only the judge 
has the discretion to decide whether evidence is illegal or irregular (BE
295
, IT
296
, UK
297
).  
Finally, it is important to note that the gathering of evidence and their presentation at trial must not 
interfere with the rights of the defence and the right of fair trial.
298
 
The exclusion of evidence: irregularity and illegality  
Irregularly obtained evidence can be withdrawn from the case file directly by the prosecutor (BE
299
, 
FR, RO) or later in court by the judge (DE, ES
300
, NL
301
, UK). However, more generally, limitations to 
the admission of evidence are often confined to public authorities (BE, FR); the judges cannot discard 
evidence produced by the private parties, defence or others, for the sole reason that it may have been 
obtained illegally or unfairly.
302
 
The judge’s task or the jury’s task is to assess the probative value of evidence. This task is especially 
important when the admissibility of evidence is poorly regulated, as is the case for instance in 
France.
303
 In some countries, the court has a discretionary power to reject (inter alia) evidence that has 
been illegally or improperly obtained (NL, UK
304
). Some countries explicitly prohibit the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree”305 (ES306, PL) while others do not  (IT307).  
In fact, the European Court of Human Rights deems the procedure fair if national legislation provides 
for the opportunity to question the authenticity of the evidence and to oppose its use,
308
 including 
through contradiction in court (BE
309
, ES, PL, RO, UK).
310
 
                                                     
 
294 See e.g. M. Delmas-Marty and J.R. Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures. 
295 Indeed, Belgium agrees that evidence gathered illegally may also be taken into account by the judge. See Cass. 18 January 
1971, Pas. 1971 I. 459; Cass. 10 June 1974, 1974 I. 1040. 
296 Art. 192 CPP. 
297 Art. 78-1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; R. v. Looseley, Att-Gen’s Reference (n°3) [2002] 2 Cr App R 29, 
relating to entrapment; see also the question of torture considered as an erosion of the right to a fair trial. 
298 e.g. in BE, Cass. 14 October 2003, Antigone case  
299 Cass., 23 March 2004 (P.040012N), R.A.B.G., 2004, p. 1061; Cass., 12 October 2005, J.L.M.B., 2006, p. 585, Rev. Dr. 
Pén., 2006, p. 211, J.T. 2006, p. 109. 
300 Art. 658 and 659 (I) CCP. See escritos de calificación provisional. 
301 Art. 359a CCP. 
302 In France, Cass. crim 28 April 1987, Bull crim n°173. More recently: Cass. crim 27 January 2010, Bull crim n°16 
(concerning documents stolen by an employee). Where there is a breach of professional secrecy, the evidence is 
admissible provided that the breach is necessary to the defence and proportionate to the rights of the parties (Cass. crim 
24 April 2007, Bull crim n°108). 
303 C. Ambroise-Castérot, P. Bonfils, Procédure pénale, Paris, PUF, 2011, 190f. 
304 S. 78 PACE 1984. 
305 The principle that prohibits the use of secondary evidence in trial that was gathered directly from primary evidence 
derived from an illegal search and seizure. 
306 STC n°114/1984, 29 November 1984. 
307 According to case law, it could be applied in Italy but the decisions of the judges on this matter are neither frequent nor 
clear. 
308 See e.g. ECtHR, Lee Davies v. Belgium, 18704/05, 28 July 2009, §42; applied by Cass., Antigone case, 14 October 2003. 
309 Cass. 18 January 1971, Pas. 1971 I. 459; Cass. 10 June 1974, 1974 I. 1040. 
310 See e.g. ECtHR, 10 March 2009, Bykov v. Russia, req. n°4378/02, §95. 
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Role and competences of intelligence services and law enforcement within the criminal justice system 
In some countries, public officials (including intelligence services) have the obligation to report crimes 
and misdemeanours (BE, FR). In this context, the relationship between judicial authorities and 
intelligence services is becoming more important (ES, IT, FR
311
, NL). Information gathered by 
intelligence services can generally be shared with prosecutorial or judicial authorities in order to open 
an investigation (BE, DE, ES, FR, NL
312
) but this information cannot always be shown in court. This 
is the case for instance in France and the United Kingdom.
313
. In France, intelligence is assessed by the 
Prosecutor, who decides whether the information is admissible to be submitted in Court.
314
  
Some countries do not differentiate whether the information is coming from intelligence services or 
from law enforcement agencies (PL), while other countries (DE, ES) do. This differentiation is 
explained by the fact that the different weight that intelligence and information gathered by law 
enforcement agencies could have. It is important to notice that, only in Italy, intelligence cannot be 
used as evidence at trial. 
315
 
Procedure for intelligence to become evidence 
The centralisation, coordination and exploitation of intelligence is increasingly organised and 
institutionalised (e.g. DE, ES, FR, IT
316
).  
For instance, France constitutes, from a law enforcement perspective, a very effective example of 
coordination between intelligence services, police, prosecutors and juges d’instruction via its 
centralised investigation and prosecution of terrorist offence and the coordination of organised crime 
cases in Paris.
317
 The national and central organisation that the DCRI
318
 is, by its composition - law 
enforcement and intelligence service agents – and its structure favours the sharing of information 
between the two services in an effective and rapid manner, leading to the so-called “judiciarisation” of 
intelligence information.
319
 Such a centralisation offers some advantages as it results in the competent 
judges and prosecutors being more specialised and in them having more knowledge and expertise in 
terrorist matters as well as the establishment of closer links with the intelligence services.  
In Germany, legislative and institutional reforms occurred to improve the coordination between the 
two bodies, including the Act on Joint Databases,
320
 which promotes the collaboration of the 
                                                     
 
311 M. Trévidic, parliamentary committee of inquiry, “Fonctionnement des services de renseignement”, National Assembly, 
14 February 2013. 
312 HR 5 September 2006, NJ 2007, 336. 
313 A. Masferrer (ed.), Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency. Security and Human Rights in countering 
Terrorism, p. 180-182. 
314 M. Trévidic, parliamentary committee of inquiry, “Fonctionnement des services de renseignement”, National Assembly, 
14 February 2013. 
315 e.g. arts. 203 and 240(2) CPP. 
316 Art. 2 Decree 2008/609. 
317 The French system is currently evolving towards a centralisation of the execution and the consequent use of judicial 
interception based on the model of the centralised system of administrative interceptions (art. 4 Law 91/73). See plate-
forme nationale des interceptions judiciaires and Commission nationale de controle des interceptions de sécurité. 
318 Gathering of the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (DST) and of the Direction centrale des Renseignements 
Généraux (RG). 
319 Interview with P. Caillol, Deputy Director of the Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice (Paris, 
28 November 2012). 
320 Gesetz zur Errichtung gemeinsamer Dateien von Polizeibehörden und Nachrichtendiensten des 
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intelligence services and police, and attempts to improve the exchange of information. The database 
contains personal data of members or supporters of a terrorist organisation and their contacts, 
suspected members or supporters of a group that supports a terrorist association, extremists who are 
ready to or tend to use violence and their contacts.
321
 With this database, the principle of the separation 
of police and intelligence services, the German Trennungsprinzip
322
, is further weakened. Intelligence 
and police forces now share the same data.
323
  
Some intelligence services can act in, for instance, intercepting telecommunication, requiring retained 
data without an authorisation by a judge and are not subject to any form of judicial scrutiny (FR, IT, 
NL, UK), which has constituted a matter of concern in certain countries.
324
  
Depending on the country, intelligence obtained by administrative warrants (administrative police and 
intelligence services) may be officially recorded in a statement (BE
325
, FR, NL
326
) in order to be 
presented as evidence at trial. This is a kind of “laundering of administrative information” in the sense 
that it integrates administrative gathering of information by the intelligence services and 
administrative police primarily without any control by the judiciary, into the judicial procedure.
327
 In 
some countries, evidence can only be disclosed in court so there is no specific procedure to be 
followed beforehand (DE, NL, PL
328
, ES, UK
329
).  
(Contd.)                                                                  
 
Bundes und der Länder (Gemeinsame-Dateien-Gesetz), 22 December 2006, BGBl. I, at 3409; a thorough discussion of the 
law is provided by Roggan and Bergemann (2007). 
321 §2 first sentence, sub-paragraphs (1a) - (3). 
322 Principle installed after World War II as a reaction to the abuses of power by the formerly centralised “secret State 
police”, the Gestapo. See T. Würtenberger, “Das Polizei- und Sicherheitsrecht vor den Herausforderungen des 
Terrorismus” in J. Masing and O. Jouanjan (Hg.), Terrorismusbekämpfung, Menschenrechtsschutz und Föderation, 2008, 
s. 27-48; A. Oemichen, Terrorism and anti-terror legislation: the terrorised legislator? A comparison of counter-
terrorism legislation and its implications on human rights in the legal systems of the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany 
and France, Intersentia, School of Human Rights Research series, vol. 34, 2009, p. 267 ff.   
323 With, for instance, the different national platforms such as the Gemeinsames Internet-Zentrum, the Gemeinsame Analyse- 
und Strategiezentrum illegale Migration, the Nationale Cyber-Abwehrzentrum and recently the Gemeinsames 
Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum; see R. Warnes, Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence 
Agency in the United States. Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, chp. V Germany, ed. B. A. Jackson, RAND, 2009, p. 101. 
324 In France, this possibility offered by Law 2006/64 has been criticised: Prosecutor for the Cour de Cassation Jean-Louis 
Nadal considers it is “indispensable […] que la phase […] de recueil des preuves soit toujours effectuée sous le contrôle 
de l’autorité judiciaire”. J.-L. Nadal, Speech pronounced for the formal hearing of the Beginning of the year of the Cour 
de Cassation, Paris, 6 January 2006, http://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_cour_26/rapport_annuel_36/ 
rapport_2005_582/deuxieme_partie_discours_585/audience_solennelle_7798.html (accessed on 1 February 2013) 
325 Art. 19/1 Law 1998 on intelligence services. C. Constit., Loi du 4 février 2010 relative aux méthodes de recueil des 
données par les services de renseignement et de sécurité (art. 2, 3, 10, 14 à 18 et 35 à 38), 2011-145, n° 4955-5014, 22 
September 2011. A procès-verbal non-classifié written by the President of the administrative commission in charge of 
monitoring specific and exceptional methods of data gathering by intelligence and security services can be transmitted. 
However, the Commission does not send a lot of PV’s to the prosecutor and this could not be the main form of evidence. 
(Interview of Prosecutor B. Michel, Federal Prosecutor Office, Belgium, 26 February 2013). 
326 Art. 36- 38 Act on Intelligence and Security Services 2002. 
327 It is also called the “judicialisation” process of evidence. 
328 Principle of immediacy, art. 207 CCP. 
329 A. Masferrer (ed.), Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency. Security and Human Rights in countering 
Terrorism, p. 181; see also, C. Walker, Terrorism and the Law, OUP, 2011, pp. 110-112. 
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Assessment of evidence: prosecution and trial 
Retained data as evidence 
Data may be disclosed on different grounds but mainly in relation to whether proceedings, criminal or 
not, are pending. However, in certain countries (e.g. in PL, RO, UK), retained data may be accessed 
by a larger number of authorities and also for purposes other than investigation.  
In order for the prosecutor and judge to assess the probative value of retained data, the original 
evidence has to be presented: a copy of the document being less valuable. However, the fact of having 
only a copy does not always prevent its admissibility (UK
330
). Some countries (e.g. RO) are working 
towards the electronic transmission of retained data, in order to avoid any alteration of the original 
data. In the United Kingdom, the judge assesses the gathering of evidence and may direct the jury on 
the value they should attach to it or exclude the evidence in consideration of it being unfairly obtained 
and prejudicial to the Defendant. 
It may not always be possible to evaluate the impact of retained data on the basis of the success of 
criminal investigations and prosecutions, because courts assess all evidence presented to them and 
rarely find that a single piece of evidence is conclusive (e.g. BE). However, some prosecutors have 
indicated that cases have been prosecuted and decided almost solely on the basis of data retained.
331
 In 
The Netherlands, for instance, from January to July 2010, historical traffic data has been a decisive 
factor in 24 court judgments.
332
 In the United Kingdom, there are data that sought to quantify the 
impact of data retention on criminal prosecutions; for three of its law enforcement agencies, retained 
data was needed in most if not all investigations resulting in criminal prosecution or conviction.
333
 
Intelligence  
As already explained, in some countries, the prosecutor assesses all evidence, including intelligence, 
in order to determine the relevance of this information as potential evidence at trial (BE
334
, DE, FR
335
, 
RO
336
, UK). In some countries, intelligence must always be corroborated by other evidence (BE
337
, 
ES
338
); it does not have any evidentiary value if it is presented as sole source of evidence. 
Evidence is also assessed in court. For instance in Romania, all elements have to be disclosed in court 
in order to be taken into account by the judge.
339
 Intelligence is then taken into account by the judge, 
                                                     
 
330 CCTV information, CCTV Advisory Service, http://www.cctv-information.co.uk/i/Digital_Images_as_Evidence (accessed 
on 4 February 2013). 
331 e.g. interview with the Prosecutor B. Michel (BE), (Brussels, 26 February 2013). 
332 Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive, COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels, 18 April 2011, p.25. 
333 Ibid. 
334 e.g. art. 29 CCP.  
335 M. Trévidic, parliamentary committee of inquiry, “Fonctionnement des services de renseignement”, National Assembly, 
14 February 2013. 
336 Art. 7 CCP. 
337 Art. 19/1 §4 Law 2010 MRD. C. Constit., Loi du 4 février 2010. 
338 Faustino Gudín Rodríguez-Magariños, “La pre Raquel Castillejo Manzanares sunta prueba pericial de inteligencia: 
análisis de la STS de 22 de mayo de 2009”, La Ley Penal, n°64, Sección Jurisprudencia aplicada a la práctica, October 
2009, p. 11. 
339 SN judgment of 20 February 2002, V KKN 586/99, Prok. i Pr. 2002, supplement "Orzecznictwo", n°11, item 10, LEX 
53048. 
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but it is not a decisive element (BE, DE, ES
340
, FR, NL
341
, RO
342
). The judge may even decide not to 
consider such evidence at all (ES
343
, RO). In some countries, evidence presented by police agencies 
has a higher value (ES
344
) compared to evidence provided by intelligence agencies. 
Due to the sensitive nature of intelligence, a number of Member States created specific disclosure 
procedures in order for this information to be admitted as evidence in court (IT
345
, UK
346
). In Italy, 
evidence is excluded but disclosure may be requested on specific grounds and it has to go through a 
specific procedure. Under this kind of procedure, the trial judge may order that intelligence should not 
be disclosed or should only be disclosed to the accused in a written form. The judge may require a full 
disclosure at some later stage in the proceedings if that is necessary to ensure the fairness of the trial. 
If the prosecutor is not in a position to disclose the material, the case may be closed (UK, IT). Finally, 
it is important to note that all national judges still have to give specific reasons for their decision, no 
matter whether the evidence presented in court has been gathered through intelligence services or law 
enforcement agencies.   
Implications of data retention for fundamental rights 
Protection of privacy vs. intrusiveness 
European framework on privacy 
Data retention interferes with the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data, which are 
fundamental rights in the EU
347. Such intrusiveness must be ‘provided for by law and respect the 
essence of those rights, subject to the principle of proportionality’348, and justified as necessary and 
meeting the objectives of general interest. This means that any limitation must
349
 (1) be formulated in 
a clear and predictable manner; (2) be necessary to achieve an objective of general interest or to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others; (3) be proportionate to the desired aim; and (4) preserve the 
essence of the fundamental rights concerned. 
Moreover, article 8(2) ECHR recognises that interference to a public authority with a person’s right to 
privacy may be justified as necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or the economic 
                                                     
 
340 STS 31.03.2010; Raquel Castillejo Manzanares, 2012, p.  4. 
341 Art. 359a CCP. 
342 Art. 410 CCP. 
343 Faustino Gudín Rodríguez-Magariños, “La presunta prueba pericial de inteligencia: análisis de la STS de 22 de mayo de 
2009”, La Ley Penal, No 64, Sección Jurisprudencia aplicada a la práctica, October 2009, 10-11. 
344 Raquel Castillejo Manzanares, 2012, p. 6. 
345 When a statement relates a State secret, the court shall inform the President of the Council of Ministers, asking that it be 
given confirmation. See also art. 256 §3 CPP. 
346 Public interests in UK Courts, http://publicinterest.info/public-interest-immunity (accessed on 11 February 2013); see 
Regina v. H. and C., conjoined appeal, Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), UKHL 3, 2004, §18; A. Masferrer (ed.), 
Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency. Security and Human Rights in countering Terrorism, p. 193. 
347 Art. 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (O.J. C 83, 30 March 2010, p. 389) guarantees 
everyone’s right to the “protection of personal data concerning him or her”. Art. 16 TFEU enshrines everyone’s right to 
the “protection of personal data concerning them”.  
348 Art. 52(1) Charter for Fundamental Rights. 
349 Commission’s Fundamental Rights Check-List for all legislative proposals in Commission Communication COM (2010) 
573/4, ‘Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union’. 
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well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
However, the ECtHR also leaves room for discretion by national courts in the admission of evidence, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
350
 Where the investigation relies on unlawfully 
obtained evidence the Court will verify whether the “unlawfulness” in the domestic terms did not 
coincide with the “unfairness” in the autonomous terms of the Convention and it would further verify 
whether the applicant had an opportunity to raise the matter before the domestic courts.
351
   
Hence, subsequent case law of the European Court of Justice and the ECtHR has developed the 
conditions that any limitation on the right to privacy must satisfy.
 352
 These judgments are of relevance 
for whether the Directive should be amended, particularly in terms of the conditions for access and use 
of retained data.  
Article 15(1) of the e-Privacy Directive and the recitals to the Data Retention Directive reiterate these 
principles underpinning the EU’s approach to data retention. However, article 11 of the Data retention 
Directive restricts such these provisions because it specifies that this article 15(1) is not applicable to 
the Directive. This means that the intrusiveness provided for by the Data Retention Directive is not 
subject to such a legal framework.
353
 
National authorities and Data Protection Acts  
Most countries have established data protection authorities that are responsible for the protection of 
data, such as those that are required to be retained by the Data Retention Directive as part of a national 
Data Protection Act.  
 
States Authorities Acts 
Belgium Commission for the protection 
of privacy (Commission de la 
protection de la vie privée) 
Law on the protection of privacy with regard to 
the processing of personal data, 08 December 
1992 
 
France National Commission of 
security interceptions and the 
Departmental Commission of 
video-surveillance  
Law 17/1978 on computers, databases and 
freedom 
Germany Federal Commissioner for data 
protection and freedom of 
information 
Federal Data Protection Act 
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) 
Italy Garante della Privacy  Code of privacy 
                                                     
 
350 ECtHR, 6 December 1988, Barbera, Messegue and Jobardo v. Spain, serie 4, n°146, §68; ECtHR, 19 February 1991, 
Isgro v. Italy, §31; 5 November 2002, Allan v. U.-K; A. Cammilleri-Subrenat, R. Prouvèze and I. Verdier-Büschel, 
Nouvelles technologies et défis du droit en Europe, L’imagerie active au service de la sécurité globale, coll. Travaux de 
droit international et européen, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2012, p. 83.  
351 ECtHR, Schenk v. Switzerland, §§47-51; Heglas, §§89-93. 
352 See e.g. Klass and others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, §§ 49-50, serie A n°28 ; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 
54934/00, § 94, ECHR 2006-XI; Liberty and others v. United Kingdom, 58243/00, § 62, 1 July 2008 ; Uzun v. Germany, 
35623/05, 2 September 2010. 
353 Because the national provisions vary considerably on the requirement of article 15(1), is does not apply by itslef to the 
data retention Directive. However, article 8 ECHR is still applicable. See n.55 for the provisions of article 15(1). 
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Netherland Data Protection Authority Data Protection Act 
Poland Inspector General for Personal 
Data Protection (Polish abbrev. 
GIODO); Polish Ombudsman 
(Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, 
literally Ombudsman for Citizen 
Rights) 
Responsible under the Personal Data Protection 
Act for supervision over the compliance of data 
processing with the provisions on the protection 
of personal data 
Romania National Authority for the 
Supervision of Personal Data 
Processing 
Law 677/2001 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data and Law 
102/2005 on the establishment, organisation and 
functioning of the National Supervisory Authority 
for Personal Data Processing. 
Spain Spanish Data Protection 
Authority  
Organic Law 15/1999, Protection of Personal 
Data  
United 
Kingdom 
Information Commissioner
354
 Data Protection Act 1998 allow such 
arrangements for purposes related to national 
security and law enforcement. 
It is noteworthy that in Poland, the GIODO has neither access to data held by intelligence services,
355
 
nor handles citizens' complaints about unlawful storage of their data
356
. His/her only possible control 
focuses on the gathering and processing of the crime-related information by law enforcement 
agencies.
357
 He/she may not act as an appeal instance or control whether a refusal of the entity 
controlling the data to disclose one's own records is legitimate or not.  
National legislations provide for the respect of the principles of necessity and proportionality in the 
access to data, which are strong criteria in the United Kingdom where there is no specific duration of 
retention and where the control by the hierarchical supervisor is important.
358
 
Current issues under discussion within Member States selected 
In many European countries constitutional debates (DE, IT, PL, RO) developed in relation to the 
implementation of the Data Retention Directive.  
                                                     
 
354 UK Info Commissioner Challenges Legality of Data Retention, Privacy International, 30 July 2002, 
http://web.archive.org/web/ 20110603035433/ https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/uk-infocommissioner-
challenges-legality-data-retention. 
355 Art. 43 s. 1 and 1a Personal Data Protection Act. 
356 Art. 43 s. 2 Personal Data Protection Act. 
357 Art. 18(1) Law of 6 July 2001 on gathering, processing, and transfer of criminal information. 
358 See e.g. in PL, in the light of the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal, the premise of the necessity of limitation referred 
to in art. 31(3) of the Polish Constitution is essentially identical to the proportionality principle and entails the statutory 
obligation to choose the least bothersome means. See, inter alia, the ruling of 26 Apr 1999, file ref. n°K 33/98, OTK z 
1999 r., Nr 4, poz. 71, the ruling of 11 May 1999, File ref. n°K 13/98, OTK z 1999 r. Nr 4, poz. 74; in the UK, Info 
Commissioner Challenges Legality of Data Retention, Privacy International, 30 July 2002; 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/uk-infocommissioner-challenges-legality-data-retention (accessed on 20 
April 2013). Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data processed in connection with the provision of public electronic 
communication services and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, COM (2005) 438 final, 26 September 2005. 
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A first controversy was displayed in demonstrations by NGOs and criticisms by operators against the 
Data Retention Directive, which focused on how the Directive violated the right to privacy (DE
359
, 
NL, RO
360
) and on the overall competences of authorities, including the increasing competences of 
intelligence services, to access data (PL). As explained above, such demonstrations certainly had an 
impact on legislative developments in at least two countries (BE, DE
361
). A second controversy is 
based on the broad definition of the different concepts such as “prevention or detection of crimes” 
(PL). Opponents of the Directive requested that specific elements must be specified including the 
conditions and circumstances under which monitoring may be used, the rights and rules on the storage 
and use of gathered data. Finally, it is important to highlight that data retention has generally been 
considered a less intrusive means of investigation than interception of communications because the 
authorities have no access to content but only to traffic data, location data and user data.  Member 
States found the retention of such data less intrusive compared with allowing for a more flexible 
communication interception regime. Some Member States, such as the United Kingdom, claimed that 
the use of retained data even helps to clear persons suspected of crimes without having to resort to 
other methods of surveillance such as interception, which could be considered more intrusive. 
However, the number of data to which authorities have access is extremely high, and the use of data 
retention is not an alternative but rather an addition to more intrusive means such as interceptions. As 
a consequence, one cannot really argue that data retention is de facto less intrusive than other means.  
Assessment of the use of retained data in the criminal justice system 
In this section, we will provide some conclusions about the current evolution of the criminal justice 
system and on the use of data retained as a result of the Data Retention Directive.  
Influence of serious crimes in the use of data 
Serious crimes have been an important driver for the introduction and increasing use of intrusive 
methods for prevention and investigation purposes.  
The adoption and implementation of the Data Retention Directive and the different national 
parliamentary and governmental works indicated a general willingness in many Member States to 
adopt efficient but less intrusive methods to counter serious crimes.
 362
 At the same time, national 
legislation and case law have shown that such methods have been increasingly used in relation to other 
offences as well. This is especially the case in BE, but also in DE
363
, PL and the UK.
364
 For instance, 
in Belgium, article 46bis §1 authorises the prosecutor, which acts before seizing of the investigative 
judge
365
, to access retained data in the case of crimes and misdemeanours. Belgium has therefore 
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361 BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08, §§ 173, 174; see Shadow evaluation report on Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC), European 
Digital Rights, 17 April 2011, p. 8. 
362 See preamble of Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. 
363 http://spd-eimsbuettel-nord.de/2012/09/27/die-spd-und-die-vorratsdatenspeicherung/; Some would argue that the use of 
data for investigating these kinds of offences is in praxis unconstitutional, since they are not part of “serious crimes”. 
364 The access to data does not depend on the gravity of the offences but more on the complexity of the case investigated by 
intelligence services and law enforcement agencies. However, legislation evolves from the Anti Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001, which imposed the existence of the most serious crimes (national security), to Data Retention (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2009, which require the access only in specific cases and in circumstances in which disclosure of 
the data is permitted or required by law. The last regulation is opening the possibility of using this method.  
365 See art. 88bis CIC. 
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significantly in extended the initial scope of the Directive. Also, in France, law enforcement officials, 
prosecutors or investigative judges cannot only gather data for the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences but also for civil litigation.
366
 
Data that needed to be retained in order to detect and investigate serious crimes are now often also 
available for intelligence agencies. For instance, in France, the administrative agents or intelligence 
services may access retained data for the prevention of terrorism acts.
367
 In Spain, the law 
implementing the Data Retention Directive also extends access to intelligence services.
368
 
In terms of statistics, it is clear that the requests for data increased, for example in France, from 38306 
in 2008 to 43559 in 2009, with 34911 accepted data requests in 2008 and 39070 in 2009.
369
 In Poland, 
in 2011 (one year after the Directive’s implementation) authorities requested users’ traffic data 
retained by operators and ISPs over 1.85 million times (almost half a million times more than in 2010 
- 1.4 million).
370
 The great majority of requests are made by courts, prosecutors and police services, 
whereas a little more than one fourth was submitted by intelligence services.
371
 However, such 
increased use of data in the criminal process is not necessarily matched by a parallel phenomenon of 
decrease in the number of serious crimes committed (DE
372
, FR).  
Since the definition of “serious crimes” differs from one Member State to another, there are no 
harmonised criteria in the context of data retention. A European definition of what constitutes a 
‘serious crime’ would be welcome in this context. Such a EU definition would contribute to harmonise 
the national definitions thereby preventing Member States to extend the original scope of the 
Directive.  
Increasing use of intelligence in the criminal justice system 
This deliverable tries to argue that intelligence services became a real actor of the criminal justice 
system, primarily because of developments taking place in the fight against terrorism and/or organised 
crime. Intelligence services may have access to retained data and so may use them for prevention 
purposes as well as for judicial purposes when needed. Therefore, it seems interesting to make a point 
on the increased use of intelligence for prosecution purposes.  
According to a strict separation of powers principle, traditionally the activities of intelligence services 
and police authorities in the prevention and investigation of crimes were clearly defined and distinct. 
In fact, there is a profound difference (at least in general terms) in the specific purposes of the two 
bodies. The police, in the framework of its judicial function, have the task of gathering information in 
                                                     
 
366 Art. L34-1 Code des postes et des communications électroniques and art. 60-1, 77-1-1, 99-3 and 230-8 CCP.  
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368 Art. 6(2) Law 25/2007. 
369 Commission Nationale de contrôle des interceptions de sécurité, “Le controle des opérations de communication des 
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relation to a specific offence for prosecution purposes; intelligence services do not have the objective 
of investigating offences but rather to recognise threats and to provide intelligence assessments to 
policy makers. In this framework, intelligence information is mostly secret, whereas police 
information is subject to scrutiny via cross-examination in court. However, nowadays the distinction is 
not so clear. Intelligence services have also been given operational tasks and this could lead to 
coordination and overlap problems between police and intelligence agencies.
373
  
This trend leads to an intense and dangerous osmosis and blurring of competences between criminal 
justice and intelligence investigations especially since most intelligence activities are covered by the 
State Secrecy principle.
374
 Intelligence activities and police investigations tend to converge in terms of 
their object, scope and means, particularly in relation to serious crime where intelligence is crucial to 
understand at best the organisational dimensions of complex, widely spread and long-lasting 
phenomena which threaten national security.
375
 In this context, the relationship between intelligence 
and the judiciary needs to be better defined, especially since retained data may be used by the 
competent authorities for both intelligence and judicial procedure purposes. 
National legislation has normalised, and even institutionalised, an increased gathering of information 
by both intelligence services and law enforcement agencies. Information gathering in the hands of 
intelligence services is the most problematic from a privacy perspective mostly because information is 
secretly gathered. Even if a hierarchical supervisor authorises the access, there is often no official 
record. As a result, individuals are not aware of the proceedings and the reasons for such an access, 
but they also often have no possibility to contest these activities. This method appears to constitute the 
most profound change in the ways crime is being prevented in the Member States. 
An even more problematic trend that can be witnessed is the use of data gathered by intelligence 
services that did not have to take into account the rules on judicial procedures in the investigation and 
prosecution of serious crimes (BE
376
, DE, FR, PL, RO, ES
377
). Law sometimes restricts the use of new 
powers by intelligence services (BE
378
, FR, RO
379
), whereas other countries allow the use of such 
intelligence for the only purpose of prevention and investigation (such as in IT where intelligence 
cannot be presented at trial).
 380
  In fact, it is noteworthy that Italy is the only State of our case studies 
that does not accept intelligence as evidence in court. In contrast, other countries (e.g. PL) witness a 
much bigger convergence of the competences of intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies 
involving an increasing use of intelligence at trial. 
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Defence lawyers and human rights organisations criticize the extended use of intelligence in court. 
They fear that the increased acceptance of intelligence, for instance in terrorism cases, is expanding 
through case law and will be increasingly accepted in other ‘less serious’ cases. Terrorism cases have 
set a precedent in this context. Belgian magistrates Daniel Fransen and Damien Vandermeersch 
confirm that there is a thin line between intelligence and judicial information in their gathering and 
increasingly in their use as evidence in court.
381
 In some countries, they may even end up having the 
same value in court (DE, FR, PL) or at least they become increasingly valuable (RO). This is certainly 
dangerous as intelligence information is gathered under little to no judicial scrutiny.  
Interference of the private sector in the criminal justice system   
Traditionally, the State and public authorities have a sort of monopoly on the law enforcement and 
criminal justice systems. Such classical feature tends to evolve due to the growing intervention of 
private actors in the fight against serious crime. The importance and purpose of such intervention vary 
significantly.
382
 The adoption of the Data Retention Directive and its implementation by Member 
States demonstrate this increasing involvement of the private sector in the criminal justice system. 
The involvement of the private sector in data retention, and more broadly the use of surveillance 
technologies by the private sector for public order purposes (e.g. video-surveillance), has led to abuses 
because private companies have sometimes used data for other purposes than those envisaged by the 
2006 Directive.
 383
  
In order to prevent such abuses, in Poland, a “Report on the retention of telecommunications data"384 
by the Secretary of State for security and public order, recommended the establishment of an 
independent supervising body appointed by Parliament, which would be in charge of controlling the 
compliance of the access to the data retained with the Constitution and other provisions (especially 
those related to the rights and freedoms of the citizens); introducing an absolute obligation to destroy 
data which has proven unhelpful or ceased to be useful for the achievement of the aim for which they 
were obtained; and a duty to report on how data subject to telecommunications secrecy have been used 
by the authorities.
385
  These recommendations have not been yet adopted but would create more 
control upon the private sector involved and, above all, would enable citizens to question the 
lawfulness and correctness of the activities performed by the Police or other services.
386
 Similar 
concerns and attempts to find a proper solution have been discussed in Spain. 
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Potential influence of an authoritarian past 
As mentioned in the introduction, a number of countries chosen as case studies have been selected 
because they have experienced authoritarian regimes. This topic will be better explored by empirical 
research of “the paper on the ethics of data retention, distinguishing between democratic and 
authoritarian regimes” of the SURVEILLE Project387.  
On the basis of the black letter legal analysis conducted for this paper, there is no conclusive evidence 
to suggest that this past had a uniform impact on national data retention regulations and institutional 
arrangements. The influence of an authoritarian past appears to vary between relevant Member States.  
In Germany, Poland and Spain, the authoritarian regime definitely had an adverse impact on 
constitutional safeguards and/or criminal procedure. The main reason for establishing extra safeguards 
in these countries’ criminal procedure after the authoritarian period ended was the necessity to set 
limits to potential abuse by the government, and to avoid that an individual exceeds existing 
limitations to power. Therefore, constitutional guarantees were established, so that all exercises of 
State power were subjected to the law and that human dignity would be respected in every situation. 
The national Constitutions of these three States established a catalogue of fundamental rights affecting 
all legal procedures,
388
 including the confidentiality of the contents of communication and of the 
specific circumstances of communications discoveries.
389
  
Germany developed an intelligence structure based on numerous independent intelligence agencies 
reflecting the federal structure with 16 Länder. This system of decentralisation to the Land level was a 
deliberate historical anomaly instituted after the Nazi regime to ensure that excessive powers were not 
centralised in the hands of the federal government.
390
 
In Poland, systemic changes initiated amendments of the code of Criminal Procedure expanded the 
scope of the courts' powers in preparatory proceedings. However, given the lack of control by courts 
of preparatory proceedings – among other reasons -, the current model does not seem clearly to break 
with the tradition of the Soviet model.  
In Spain, a decision of the Supreme Court of 27 February 2012
391
, declared that the amnesty law, 
under appeal, is part of a transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy. This transition is 
considered as a model and was the result of the embrace between the "two Spains" faced in the Civil 
War. So, it is not a rule imposed by the victorious of the conflict to obtain impunity for their actions. 
Laws were enacted with the agreement of all political forces, with an obvious sense of 
reconciliation.
392
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The existence of a former authoritarian regime did not seem to have influenced the issue of data 
retention and the increased protection of human rights in this context in either Italy or Romania. The 
ECtHR
393
 played a more important role in the so-called democratisation process of the Romanian 
criminal system. In Italy, the most important influence on criminal procedure in this context results 
from the implication and alleged abuses of intelligence services during the 1960s and 1970s terrorist 
attacks. The intelligence services’ involvement (and the use of the information they gather) is thus 
highly framed and scrutinize (e.g. by the establishment of a specific Parliamentary Committee).
394
   
Conclusion 
This deliverable has analysed the issue of data retention in the EU for the purpose of investigation and 
prosecution of serious crimes. Specific attention was given to the duration of the retention, the 
authorities who authorise the retention and have access to the data retained as well as the procedure to 
be followed, and finally the scope of the retention. Further attention has been given to the tests of 
necessity and proportionality, as well as to the right to privacy and the assessment of the relative 
intrusiveness of data retention by comparison to other means of investigation.   
This deliverable aimed to test the “catalysing effect” of serious crime on the increasing use of data 
retained by law enforcement officials and intelligence services for the purpose of investigation and 
prosecution of serious crimes. Indeed, the threat of serious crime was the basis for the adoption of the 
Data Retention Directive and, because of the lack of a definition on what constituted serious crime at 
the EU level, Member States extended, on one hand, the scope of the access to these data and, on 
another hand, the authorities who may have access, including in particular intelligence services. The 
Directive contributes to the blur of competences between law enforcement authorities and intelligence 
services in the prevention and investigation of serious crime
395
 as well as to a general shift towards 
prevention, proactive investigations and intelligence-led policing within the criminal justice system.
396
 
Finally, despite the fact that data retention has been always considered as a less intrusive means 
compared to the interception of communications, and was always seen by the Member States as a very 
valuable means of investigation, the number of data to which authorities have access is extremely 
high, and the use of data retention is not an alternative but rather an addition to more intrusive means 
such as interceptions. As a consequence, one cannot really argue that data retention is de facto less 
intrusive than other means. 
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